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THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACTS IN
INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS
DAVID V. SNYDER*
This Article considers, from legal, practical, moral, and policy perspectives,
Model Contract Clauses (MCCs) to protect the human rights of workers in
international supply chains. The product of the ABA Business Law Section
Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in International Supply
Contracts, the MCCs are an effort to provide companies with carefully researched
and well-drafted clauses to incorporate human rights policies into supply contracts
(purchase orders, master vendor agreements, and the like). The Article discusses
the impetus, goals, and strategies of the MCCs and explains the paradigm of the
corporate, operational, and political landscape for which they are designed,
including the seeming lack of emphasis on worker health and safety. An overview
of some of the doctrinal issues and solutions is provided, emphasizing the objective
* Professor of Law and Director, Business Law Program, American University
Washington College of Law. Many thanks to those who have aided my (still evolving)
thinking and writing on this subject, including Susan Carle, Muriel Fabre-Magnan,
Paul Gaiardo, J.E. Lendon, Jonathan Lipson, Thomas Mackall, Elizabeth Meyer,
Brishen Rogers, and Charles Sabel; the members of the American Bar Association
Business Law Section Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in Supply
Contracts, which I have the privilege to chair; the organizers and participants from this
symposium, New Perspectives: A Discussion on Modern Global Supply Chains, of
which this paper is a part; other participants in the panel Protecting Human Rights in
Supply Chains: Moving from Policy to Action held by the Association of American Law
Schools (Jan. 4, 2019); and the participants in the American University Business Law
Faculty Workshop and the Atelier des obligations of the Université de Paris II (PanthéonAssas). I would like to acknowledge summer research funding from the law school and
would like to thank Katherine Borchert, Nicholas Burns, Michael T. Francel, and Chiara
Vitiello for research assistance. Finally, I want to express my particular gratitude to HansWolfgang Micklitz and the participants in the seminar he invited me to give at the
European University Institute, a heavenly haven and school for scholars, where I began
to see these issues in a new light. To be clear, though, some who have helped may think
me thoroughly misguided, and all mistakes and misjudgments are my own.
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of the MCCs to be legally effective and operationally likely. On a more theoretical
note, it is argued that international supply chain contracts that attend to moral
issues like the human rights, health, and safety of workers are a new kind of social
contract, supplementing but not supplanting more classical notions of the social
contract, with which they share some characteristics. In particular, the moral
nature of these supply chain agreements is likened to the normative goals of the
social contract, but these new social contracts necessarily move in more contemporary
directions because they are typically constituted by multinational enterprises—
corporations quite different from the individuals and states conceived by the classical
theorists. In addition, supply contracts, and the supply chains that they constitute,
cross state lines and geographic boundaries, reaching past the nation-state. After
arguing that companies have a moral duty to the workers in their supply chains, the
Article suggests that companies should protect them through voluntary contractual
undertakings such as those in the MCCs. The place of public regulation is
considered as well, including the possibility of Good Samaritan-style protection for
companies that take ameliorative steps. Finally, the role of experimentalist
governance in a possible new version of the MCCs is considered briefly.
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The common law has traditionally eschewed theory and the statement
of broad principle, but this does not mean that its instinct for the
possible and the practical cannot be justified in terms of principle.1
—Alexander McCall Smith

INTRODUCTION
This contribution offers an academic consideration of the Model
Contract Clauses (MCCs) published by the ABA Business Law Section
Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in International
Supply Contracts (the “Working Group”).2 The Article takes on several
different tasks. It explains the impetus, goals, and strategies behind
the MCCs and the basic paradigm for which they were designed. It
also suggests that international supply chain contracts that attend to
the human rights, health, and safety of workers are a new kind of social
contract. On a related note, the Article argues that companies bear a
moral responsibility to the workers in their supply chains, and that the
companies can fulfill that responsibility, in part, through appropriate
supply contracts. In short, supply contracts that transform moral
duties into legal ones in a globalized, extraterritorial economic world
1. Alexander McCall Smith, The Duty to Rescue and the Common Law, in THE DUTY
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 55, 56 (Michael A. Menlow & Alexander McCall
Smith eds., 1993). Professor McCall Smith is nowadays famous as a novelist, but for
many years he was a distinguished law professor.
2. David V. Snyder & Susan A. Maslow, Human Rights Protections in International
Supply Chains—Protecting Workers and Managing Company Risk: 2018 Report and Model
Contract Clauses from the Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in International
Supply Contracts, 73 BUS. LAW. 1093 (2018) [hereinafter Model Contract Clauses].

TO RESCUE:
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are a new kind of social contract. The legal and policy implications of
these arguments are also considered.
This newer social contract provides a necessary supplement to the
social contract conceived by the Enlightenment thinkers and their
classical predecessors.3 Through the lens of social contract theory, we
can see how the privately ordered, contractual structure of a large,
complex, and far-reaching supply chain, often involving thousands of
people directly or indirectly, takes on the kind of organizational functions
of a social contract in order to achieve mutually beneficial cooperative
relationships. At the same time, this lens brings into focus some of the
moral aspects of contracting, illuminating central and ancient ideas about
law and its functions and goals, obligations with their implications and
imperfections, and lawyers with their multiple duties and hopes.
Frequently this lawyerly work is technical and obscure, but
sometimes, tragically, it blares from the front page. At least since the
sweatshop scandals of the 1990s, the problem has flared into Western
consciousness every few years, sometimes because of human
trafficking, modern slavery, or child labor, and more recently because
of catastrophic factory fires and building collapses. Many recall when
Tazreen Fashions, a garment factory in Dhaka, Bangladesh, caught fire
and killed 112 people, with many more seriously injured. The factory
had employed about 1500 workers and produced clothes for retailers
such as Walmart and Sears. The building had been found in violation
of safety standards, including fire exits.4 A few months later, another
3. It is also a different kind of “new social contract” than that expounded by Ian
Macneil in his relational theory of contract, see THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN
INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACT RELATIONS xii (1980), and certainly not the same as
the “National Bargain” of Robert Reich, see THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING
OURSELVES FOR 21st-CENTURY CAPITALISM, ch. 5 (1991), or Jill Esbenshade’s “social
contract” whereby “working-class brothers and sisters” commit “to contain their
struggle” while employers “commit[] to share their rising profits” and the government
“commit[s] to regulate and mediate the relationship and to provide a crucial safety
net,” see MONITORING SWEATSHOPS: WORKERS, CONSUMERS, AND THE GLOBAL APPAREL
INDUSTRY 13 (2004) (citing REICH).
4. See, e.g., Steve Henn, Factory Audits and Safety Don’t Always Go Hand in Hand,
NPR (May 1, 2013, 10:26 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/05/01/180103898/foreignfactory-audits-profitable-but-flawed-business; Matt Stiles, Documents: Wal-Mart Auditors
Inspect Bangladesh Factory, Find Safety Flaws, NPR (Apr. 30, 2013, 6:48 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2013/04/30/180123158/documents-wal-mart-auditors-inspectbangladeshi-factory-find-safety-flaws. The effectiveness of monitoring and audit
schemes is beyond the scope of this Article, but those issues are certainly relevant. For
a perspective on the issue, consider ESBENSHADE, supra note 3, including the literature
review in chapter 6. For another, more recent, perspective, see RICHARD M. LOCKE,
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Dhaka factory collapsed, resulting in the deaths of 1129 people. The
collapse occurred just one day after inspection teams had discovered
structural flaws in the building. Some businesses in the building had
closed because of the unsafe conditions, but others ordered their
employees to work, where they were crushed to death.5 There have been
many other disasters, not only in Bangladesh, killing and maiming
workers.6 There will be more.
This project is motivated by two crucial ideas: horrifying things happen
in international supply chains too often, and lawyers want—and are
able—to help. Business lawyers, because they are close to the companies
and contracts that animate the supply chain, are uniquely positioned to
achieve progress.7 The MCCs are designed to help lawyers in this work—
the technical aspects of which are unusually difficult—and to provide a
clear value proposition to companies to persuade them to adopt
ameliorative policies. The goal is to implement policies that are legally
effective and operationally likely to protect the human rights of workers.
The MCCs are simultaneously ambitious and modest. Their ambition
is to have a real effect for real people. The basis for this hope is the ability
of contracts to allow planning, promising, verification, and remediation.
The customary place of contracts in the legal and business worlds grounds
this hope: contracts are taken seriously; they are used in management,
operations, and manufacturing as well as in the legal world; and their
function and efficacy in the legal world gives them more force elsewhere.
At the same time, the MCCs are purely legal: they are legalese. Most
importantly, they do not take on the substantive obligations that are of
the most interest. For example, they do not say how old workers need to
be (at what age is child labor objectionable?), how many fire exits are
required, or from where materials must be sourced. This minimalist
strategy is purposeful though controversial. Primarily, it is practical.
Standards will necessarily vary by industry. Apparel manufacturers will
care about cotton sourcing, while electronics companies will have no
interest in cotton. Just as importantly, wide consensus has so far proved

THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER: PROMOTING LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 35–39 (2013).
5. Julfikar Ali Manik & Jim Yardley, Building Collapse in Bangladesh Leaves Scores
Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/world/asia/
bangladesh-building-collapse.html.
6. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
7. See generally E. Christopher Johnson, Jr., Business Lawyers Are in a Unique Position to Help
Their Clients Identify Supply-Chain Risks Involving Labor Trafficking and Child Labor, 70 BUS. LAW.
1083 (2015) (noting that business lawyers can help their clients identify supply chain risks).
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impossible.8 But particular parties, or even industries, can reach some
agreement. These clauses increase the probability that such an agreement
will be legally binding and operationally likely. That is the primary goal.
Much work has been done already, and it has been crucial,
groundbreaking work. The UN Guiding Principles are perhaps best
known,9 and they have shown a way forward. There are many other
efforts, including other principles and policies10 as well as legislative
and regulatory attempts primarily aimed at human trafficking and
conflict minerals.11 These efforts involve not only countless trade-offs, but

8. Child labor is illustrative. At what age is labor objectionable? Many children
work; many parents and societies view this work as important to the moral and social
formation of children. Work by very young children who should be in school may be
highly objectionable; a seventeen-year-old child who works on the family farm during
the summer when school is not in session may not be objectionable. Where lines are
to be drawn, and who should draw them, is the subject of considerable debate, even
within the United States. See, e.g., Andrew Van Dam, 452 Children Died on the Job in the
U.S. Between 2003 and 2016, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/business/2018/12/20/child-labor-deaths-us-twenty-first-century (“Child labor
exists in the United States in the 21st century. It’s legal and widespread . . . .”). The
variation is likely much wider internationally.
9. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner, Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework,
U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents
/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf. For recent guidance on how
companies can use them, with particular emphasis on the guidance documents from
the International Bar Association, see John F. Sherman, III, Wise Counselling on Global
Supply Chains: The IBA Practical Guide on Business and Human Rights for Business Lawyers,
BUS. & HUM. RTS. REV. 22 (2017). Business and human rights is an entire field of study,
and no effort is made here to review or cite even the leading literature in the field.
These notes simply highlight some of the key contributions, like the U.N. Guiding
Principles, and a few articles discussing them. The cited sources should help lead
interested readers into the vastness of the literature.
10. See, e.g., ABA Model Business and Supplier Policies on Labor Trafficking and Child
Labor, ABA (Jan. 9, 2019), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/init
iatives_awards/child_labor. See generally Johnson, supra note 7.
11. Consider, for example, Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015
(TFTEA), Pub. L. No. 114-125, 130 Stat. 122 (2016); Trafficking Victims Protection
Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7112 (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–1591 (2012);
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2013 (TVPRA) (Title XII of the
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54
(2013)); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), § 1502 (conflict minerals); California’s Transparency
in Supply Chain Act of 2012 (TSCA), CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (2012); FAR §§ 52.22250–59 (2017); Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30 (UK); the French Corporate Duty of
Vigilance Law, Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des
sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-399 of March 27, 2017

2019]

THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACTS IN SUPPLY CHAINS

1875

they are riven by a complex of geopolitical and economic interests that
can hamper their effectiveness. For these reasons, many of the legislative
solutions are narrowly limited, and the NGO and soft law projects that
publish principles for companies to follow not only face similar pressures
to compromise but are often hortatory, aspirational, or vague. Between
the work of the United Nations (UN), quangos, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), legislatures, and regulators, the rules and tools can
seem bewildering, if not overwhelming, at least to an outsider.12
Some of the most direct and effective intervention can come from
companies themselves, particularly the Western buyers at the top of
the supply chain. They see this, and their energies have been extensive
and generally fall into one or more of three categories. Most
prominent has been the adoption of policies, perhaps based on the
UN Guiding Principles or one of the other projects, that the company
posts on its website. These policies are sometimes aspirational and
sometimes reflect a corporate commitment; the distinction, of course,
can be legally decisive.13 Sometimes the commitment extends to
requiring suppliers and others in the supply chain to agree to adhere
to the corporate “code of conduct” or “ethical business practices.”14
Often such agreements may be legally required, as when the buyer is
on the duty of vigilance of parent companies and contractors], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], Mar. 28, 2017; Directive 2014/95/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive
2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information by
Certain Large Undertakings and Groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 1. For more on European
and Australian efforts, see generally Davide Casale, Joint Responsibility of Enterprises for
the Health and Safety of Their Contractors’ Workers: Recent Trends in Italian Law, 36 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 131 (2014); Paul Harpur & Philip James, The Shift in Regulatory Focus
from Employment to Work Relationships: Critiquing Reforms to Australian and U.K.
Occupational Safety and Health Laws, 36 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 111 (2014); Claudia
Schubert, The Case of AFOA v. Port of Seattle: A German Point of View, 36 COMP. LAB. L.
& POL’Y J. 149 (2014); Louise Vytopil, Contractual Control and Labour-Related CSR Norms
in the Supply Chain: Dutch Best Practices, 8 UTRECHT L. REV. 155 (2012).
12. For a collection, see Radu Mares, The Limits of Supply Chain Responsibility: A
Critical Analysis of Corporate Responsibility Instruments, 79 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 193 (2010),
but the list is not complete. One additional entry, for example, from Amnesty
International, is the Human Rights Principles for Companies, ACT 70/01/98 (1998),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/148000/act700011998en.pdf.
13. Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Nat’l Consumers League v. WalMart Stores, Inc., No. 2015 CA 007731 B, 2016 WL 4080541, at 11 (D.C. Super. Ct. July
22, 2016) (qualifying language such as “expect,” “goal,” and “ask” shows an aspiration
rather than a promise or commitment).
14. See id. at 2–4, 11; see also Vendor Code of Conduct, ABERCROMBIE & FITCH,
http://corporate.abercrombie.com/af-cares/sustainability/social/vendor-code-of-conduct.
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subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation.15 And sometimes the
commitment involves a complex of other parties, as where a Western
buyer joins a standard-setting organization (like the Fair Labor
Association or the Worker Rights Consortium) and requires its
suppliers (so-called “first tier suppliers” or colloquially “first-tiers”) and their
suppliers and subcontractors to join the same organization. Membership
in the organization entails a commitment to abide by the organization’s
principles (e.g., to protect worker health and safety and to guard against
forced labor) and an agreement to be audited by that organization or its
agents.16 But these details can await further development below.
The point for now is more basic. Behind the MCCs are two stories, a
seemingly straightforward effort and a wishfully simple hope. One story
is notorious: the tragically repeated human catastrophes that haunt
international supply chains. The other story is technocratic, revolving
around bar association activities and corporate organization. The MCCs
that resulted from all of this are an effort to prevent more human loss, to
exercise corporate power in a morally conscious way, and to be as
hardheaded and as practical as any good business lawyer.
A critical part of practicality is an eye to what it takes to get a deal
closed. Sometimes closing a deal means skipping the hard part. Such a
move is risky, but neither businesses nor business lawyers can live in a
world without risk. A term sheet for a business deal will leave much for
later development and negotiation; the same is true for letters of intent
and the like. Complex business arrangements cannot close every hole
or forecast every possibility. All contracts are necessarily incomplete.17
Closing a deal will sometimes mean leaving more holes, or larger ones,
than either party desires. But agreement beforehand may be too
difficult, too costly, or even impossible, and sometimes parties prefer to
leave the hole and close the deal.

15. FAR §§ 52.222-50–59. See generally Lyndsey Conrad et al., Mandated Corporate
Responsibility for Human Trafficking: New Federal Acquisition Regulation Steps up Supply Chain
Accountability, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 73, 73–74, 87 (2015). According to some assessments, the
codes of conduct are ineffective, or at least insufficiently effective, rendering the companies
that adopt them out of compliance with public law mandates. See Debra Cohen Maryanov,
Comment, Sweatshop Liability: Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Governance of Labor Standards
in the International Supply Chain, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 397 (2010).
16. See generally MARTIN DAVIES & DAVID V. SNYDER, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN
GOODS: GLOBAL SALES IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 236–43 (2014).
17. E.g., Richard R.W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 568, 587 n.43
(2006) (“[C]ontracts are necessarily incomplete, even when written by sophisticated parties.”).
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That has been part of the strategy of the MCCs, and there are two
obvious roads that have not (yet) been taken. Most obviously, as
mentioned earlier, the MCCs do not set the human rights standards that
will apply to suppliers. Similarly, they do not set standards for buyers
(even though many would argue that buyers’ demands for low cost and
quick production are a significant cause of the problems). The reasons
have been sketched already and will receive fuller attention below. In
short, the MCCs do not attempt to solve all of the problems in supply
chains; their aim is simply to be part of a necessarily multifaceted solution.
Less obviously and perhaps more interestingly, the MCCs do not
seek to set up an elaborate structure of governance for the supply chain
relationship. Such structures have generated serious interest from
political scientists and political theorists, and practically speaking, they
may be the most promising road to greater success in making
improvements on the ground. Such efforts are much more ambitious
than the current version of the MCCs, but if there were to be an effort
for Model Contract Clauses 2.0, this road deserves further exploration.
These issues receive more attention below.18
I. THE PROBLEMS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE
MODEL CONTRACT CLAUSES
Identifying the problems to be addressed is often a productive starting
point. There are several, and they will be described shortly. Since the
MCCs were drafted with a lawyerly, problem-solving, fact-based attitude,
sketching a paradigmatic supply chain setup will be a useful first step. Then
the problems can be more easily identified, separated, and understood.
A. A Supply Chain Paradigm for Human Rights Protections
This paradigm is simplified and stylized, as paradigms necessarily
are. It is based on some research19 and some experience, but I cannot

18. See infra Section III.B.
19. Perhaps the leading study on protecting workers in international supply chains
is by LOCKE, supra note 4. Numerous other works are cited elsewhere in this Article.
Information can also be gathered from case studies such as Christopher A. Bartlett et
al., IKEA’s Global Sourcing Challenge: Indian Rugs and Child Labor (B), HARV. BUS. SCH.,
No. 9-906-415 (rev. Nov. 14, 2006); Dana Brown & Jette Steen Knudsen, Trip Trap:
Managing Certification in the Global Supply Chain, RICHARD IVEY SCH. OF BUS. FOUND., No.
W14528 (Oct. 24, 2014); Monali Malvankar, Nokia India: Battery Recall Logistics,
RICHARD IVEY SCH. OF BUS. FOUND., No. W11082 (May 4, 2011). But these are only
tastes: the management and study of supply chains is its own discipline—universities
offer degrees in the subject—and this Article cannot attempt a canvas of the literature.
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claim that it is an empirically based model, which would have to be the
subject of a different paper. If empirical investigation reveals
significantly different paradigms, then some of the thinking may need
to be revisited. In essence, the purpose of this section is to explain the
assumptions so that as assumptions are questioned, relaxed or
expanded, the strategies and arguments can be refined or revised.
Here, then, is the paradigm. Western Company20 sells goods in
consumer markets in the developed world, primarily in the United
States but also in Europe and elsewhere. Western Company is large
and well known, and its brand is valuable. Western Company is
organized so that it has a purchasing department, an operations
department, a product development department, and a marketing
department. These are the business departments. It also has a general
counsel’s office; an office devoted to social responsibility (CSR
office),21 which may have titles and responsibilities related to
environmental sustainability, diversity, ethics, and the like; as well as
other departments. Contracts, compliance, and legal policies are the
province of the general counsel’s office. The contracts are drafted and
reviewed by the general counsel’s office. The business departments
develop products, decide production and marketing timeframes,
acceptable costs of production and sales, and they consider who can
make the products. Much of the contract negotiation is done by the
business departments, often without much involvement from the
general counsel’s office, which will only be involved in large
negotiations and which will briefly review the resulting contract for
compliance with the law and company policies. Those policies may be

Aside from the many works of Locke, interested readers will find that Dara O’Rourke
and Abraham Ringer, infra note 26, as well as GARY GEREFFI (most recently his GLOBAL
VALUE CHAINS AND DEVELOPMENT: REDEFINING THE CONTOURS OF 21ST CENTURY
CAPITALISM (2018)) offer entry into the literature. Readers interested in more
theoretical considerations might start with IGLP Law & Global Production Working
Group, The Role of Law in Global Value Chains: A Research Manifesto, 4 LONDON REV. INT’L
L. 57 (2016) [hereinafter Manifesto]; Klaas Hendrik Eller, Private Governance of Global
Value Chains from Within: Lessons from and for Transnational Law, 8 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL
THEORY 296 (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20414005.2017.1307310. Both offer
citations to recent literature and the former also surveys current research projects.
20. This name is chosen because it is descriptive. The hypothetical company in
the paradigm has no relation to The Western Company, a western-wear retailer in
Denver, or to any other real company. Some literature might prefer to call it the
Northern Company (as opposed to the workers in the Global South—not to be
confused with the southern United States).
21. I will call it the CSR office, although that is an unlikely name for it.
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related to labor practices, anticorruption, transparency, quality
control, product reliability, and the like. The CSR office may be
involved in assuring that the chosen contracting counterparty will
comply with, and does not raise any red flags with respect to, Western
Company’s policies on responsible business practices.
The counterparty in the contract that Western Company signs is First
Tier Supplier (FTS). FTS may make some components of Western
Company products itself, but subcontractors of FTS will perform much
if not all of the manufacturing. At a minimum, then, the supply chain
will consist of Western Company at the top, FTS in the middle, and
subcontractors at the bottom. Quite possibly there will be more layers,
but this description will suffice for the paradigm. To engage FTS, Western
Company will sometimes use an agent or broker.22 Sometimes, though,
an FTS will itself function like an agent or broker. In these situations the
primary job for FTS is to find others to do the work. FTS in such cases, in
purely economic terms, may simply take a cut, i.e., a percentage of the
sales, although the formal legal and accounting arrangements may call
for a sale from subcontractors to FTS and a further sale by FTS to Western
Company. Much if not all of the manufacturing will take place in
developing countries distantly removed from the principal place of
business and primary markets of Western Company.
Once the contract is signed, there are two salient pressures for the
purposes of this Article: keeping costs low and production fast. The
consumer market moves quickly, not only in the most obvious
industries like fashion, which is characterized by its constantly
changing styles, but in other industries like sporting goods and
electronics. Partly these pressures are tied to fashions (even outside
the fashion industry) and changing consumer tastes and demands, but
much of it is purposeful revenue generation: increasing revenue requires
increasing sales, and increasing sales is aided by introducing new products
to sell. Put simply, a smartphone company is anxious for everyone to want
a new model as soon as possible, even if the smartphone everyone has
works perfectly well. And most obviously, lowering costs of production
increases profits, and lowering labor costs is a key component of this
strategy. The pressure on the supply chain that comes from cost control
is obvious. What may be less apparent, but also important, are the
problems that come from time pressure. Bringing new products to
22. See, e.g., Filanto S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1230
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (involving a contract between a New York firm and an Italian
manufacturer secured through the firm’s foreign agent in the United Kingdom).
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market quickly can easily lead to excessive work hours, exploitation of
transient workers, or cheating on supply chain commitments.23
Operational aspects of the paradigm are also relevant. There are
workers on the factory floor. They will receive instructions either orally
or in writing from a supervisor. They need to be told, in other words,
what to do: what to sew and how many; how many containers to fill
and of what sizes; in short, how to fulfill the contract for the production
of goods. The supervisors will receive this information in writing
(electronically or perhaps on paper) to pass along to the workers. The
supervisors will also need this information to manage scheduling,
production timing, quality control, and countless other manufacturing
tasks. In the paradigm, much of this information appears not in the
main body of the contract—the legalese—but in a schedule attached
to a contract, or a purchase order issued under a master agreement—
for example, a master vendor agreement—or the like. Operations
personnel will not be looking at representations, warranties, and
merger clauses; they will be looking at a schedule or appendix that is
only referred to in the legalese. Other operationally important matters
are also stated elsewhere, like the steps that Western Company expects
FTS and subcontractors to take to protect Western Company’s
intellectual property. These schedules or appendixes or purchase
orders, in short, tell the production staff at FTS or its subcontractors
what to do, perhaps how to do it, and also what will be checked or
monitored or audited (e.g., the production run will be monitored for
quantity and quality; IP safeguards may be checked or audited; and so on).
Moving away from operations and back to corporate headquarters,
the paradigm includes the realities of corporate politics. For the most
part, the company is managed from the C Suite, senior or executive
vice presidents for operations, for marketing, and so on, and is run by
the people who report directly to the people in the C Suite offices. The
general counsel sits in the C Suite but does not have quite as much to do
with the core business of the company—developing products, producing
them, selling them. Nevertheless, the general counsel and the CEO sit on
the board of directors or are at least present at the board meetings.
The chief officer in charge of CSR, like the general counsel, may
have a hand in various operational aspects of the company, particularly
relating to labor, due diligence, reporting, and marketing. Like the
general counsel, the CSR chief is a bit of an afterthought for the
business people—not in the literal sense of being sought out afterwards,
23. See LOCKE, supra note 4, ch. 6.
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although that is often true with respect to the general counsel—but is
viewed as an extra step in the process. CSR is a supernumerary
department or an extra person who must be permitted on the team.
The overall performance of the company and the executive officers
are overseen by the board, and large matters of policy are the province
of the board. The board does little or nothing that is not at the behest
of the CEO, however. The board may adopt a policy, for instance, but
it may or may not be put into everyday practice. What happens in the
operations of the company is up to management, not the board.
In this paradigm there is another set of players: NGOs who will
mount an outcry and advocate for negative consequences for Western
Company if it misbehaves. The NGOs will do a bit of monitoring and
will “name and shame” companies for misbehavior; they may also try
to help companies build new capabilities for protecting workers. The
NGO outcry will be at its most strident not when monitoring reveals lapses
but when something terrible happens. The NGOs will also launch
lawsuits against offending companies24 and will seek negative publicity
against them. The NGOs will also advocate for Western Company to
adopt different practices and will issue reports on which companies follow
preferred policies, which do not, and which companies are the best and
worst.25 The preferred policies will vary depending on the NGO.
The paradigm just described underlies the thinking in this Article,
but there are variations. In some, the link to the consumer market may
be weak, invisible, or nonexistent. This will have several implications.
First, there is not likely to be nearly the same level of consumer
consternation and market effect if there turn out to be problems with,
say, the steel production for oceangoing cargo vessels, or the
manufacturing of rail presses used by heavy-truck manufacturers, and
so on. Similarly, the NGOs may have trouble gaining as much traction
in their efforts, and either for that reason or others may have less
interest in devoting energy and money into monitoring, reporting, and

24. E.g., Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Nat’l Consumers League v. WalMart Stores, Inc., No. 2015 CA 007731 B, 2016 WL 4080541 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 22, 2016).
25. For further information on the empirical and theoretical bases for the part of
the paradigm described in this paragraph, see generally THE POLITICS OF LEVERAGE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: NAME, SHAME, AND SANCTION 32-102 (H. Richard Friman
ed., 2015), particularly the chapters on Revisiting Human Rights Naming and Shaming.
See e.g., ESBENSHADE, supra note 3, at 10–12, 52–58 (on the role of civil society and
NGOs in monitoring sweatshops and exerting pressure); LOCKE, supra note 4, ch. 4;
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights
Enforcement Problem, 62 INT’L ORG. 689 (2008).
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the like. Also, whatever effect consumer demand has on the
production of untainted goods may play differently in the market for
rail presses than in the market for chocolate.26
Regardless of the variation in the paradigm—whether it involves a
consumer market or not—one assumption made here is that the
leadership of Western Company wants to “do the right thing.”
Operating in the real world as it does, Western Company faces
constraints on achieving the ideal. The executives know that they will
not reach the ideal and that their version of the “right thing” might
differ from the NGOs’. But they would like to do their best, and they
are willing to incur costs to do so, with the understanding that their
best also includes considering the financial health of the company,
which means taking into account revenues and time-to-market
measures, costs, profits, shareholders, domestic employees, and others.
It also means taking into account the reputation of the company,
which—particularly in the consumer-market version of the
paradigm—aligns with their desire to do the right thing.
This alignment is not perfect: protecting the reputation of the
company, keeping it compliant with a variety of laws and regulations
that apply differently and variously around Western’s global
operations, and doing the right thing will induce a number of the
decisionmakers to assign these tasks to particular departments, the key
one of which is the CSR department, and another one of which is the
general counsel’s office. This division of labor allows some executives
26. The wording here is deliberate. There is some indication that consumer
demand for untainted goods will help clean up supply chains. See, e.g., Laura Enax et
al., Effects of Social Sustainability Signaling on Neural Valuation Signals and Taste-Experience
of Food Products, 9 FRONTIERS IN BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2015), https://www.frontier
sin.org/articles/10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00247/full (chocolate experiment); Jens
Hainmueller et al., Consumer Demand for Fair Trade: Evidence from a Multistore Field
Experiment, 97 REV. ECON. & STAT. 242 (2015) (coffee experiment); Howard Kimeldorf
et al., Consumers with a Conscience: Will They Pay More?, 5 CONTEXTS 24 (2006) (sock
study). Even these cautiously optimistic studies, however, report results that must be
qualified by limits on how much more consumers are willing to spend and particularly
by consumers’ limited capacity to take in information, as was made clear by the sock
study. See Kimeldorf et al., supra, at 26–28. Other studies are even less optimistic.
Adam S. Chilton & Galit A. Sarfaty, The Limitations of Supply Chain Disclosure Regimes, 53
STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2017). For an assessment on the environmental side, see Dara
O’Rourke & Abraham Ringer, The Impact of Sustainability Information on Consumer
Decision Making, 20 J. INDUS. ECOLOGY 882 (2015) (arguing that “providing more or
better information on sustainability issues will likely have limited impact on changing
mainstream consumer behavior unless it is designed to connect into existing decisionmaking processes”), and more generally, DARA O’ROURKE, SHOPPING FOR GOOD (2012).

2019]

THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACTS IN SUPPLY CHAINS

1883

and departments to leave human rights concerns to others. Moreover,
reputation can be protected through marketing efforts in addition to
and to some degree instead of substantive remediation. The NGOs
and some consumers are often quite worried about this “whitewashing”
phenomenon.27 They will be worried that the attractive, glossy efforts
of the marketing department will sufficiently obscure supply chain
problems so that Western Company will ignore the issue.28 The
company, in short, may enjoy something close to the magical
invisibility that enables the company to do wrong with impunity.29
Finally, and crucially, the paradigm assumes that regulation is increasing,
but that it remains primarily if not exclusively limited to regimes of disclosure,
due diligence, or both. Widespread international imposition of liability for
injuries in the supply chain—whether such a regime is desirable or not—is
presumed to be highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.30

27. Medea Benjamin, Foreword to ARCHON FUNG ET AL., CAN WE PUT AN END TO
SWEATSHOPS? ix (2001) (“[T]he real battle was over how to ensure that the company’s
code was not just a lofty document on a piece of paper but something that had
meaning on the ground.”). Salminen argues that even enforceable contractual
liability against Western buyers allows “whitewashing.” Jaakko Salminen, The Accord on
Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh: A New Paradigm for Limiting Buyers’ Liability in
Global Supply Chains?, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. 411, 412 (2018). I am keenly aware that similar
arguments may be leveled against the MCCs. See Sarah Dadush, Contracting for Human Rights:
Looking to Version 2.0 of the ABA Model Contract Clauses, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1519, 1534–45 (2019).
28. Concerns are not limited to marketing. ESBENSHADE, supra note 3, at 11, argues
that even monitoring production and auditing supply chains are methods used by
companies “primarily to avoid bad publicity and to address consumer concerns.”
29. This problem is one impetus for the social contract: Plato suggests the idea
(in Glaucon’s argument) that a person will prefer to do injustice as long as he will not
be punished, as would be the case if he had a magical ring that could make him
invisible while engaging in wrongdoing. In this sense, the fear is that marketing and
public relations give Western Company something like this magical ring. In short, PR is
the corporate ring of Gyges. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. II, 359a–360d, in THE REPUBLIC
OF PLATO 37–38 (Allan Bloom trans., 2d ed. 1968). (Current readers can conceive of the
ring of Gyges as being much the same as Harry Potter’s cloak of invisibility). The
conventional agreement to law and contracts to achieve justice is a compromise to avoid
the undesirable results of accommodating everyone’s presumed desire to do as much
injustice as possible. These matters are taken up infra in Section II.A.
30. Imposition of supply chain liability remains quite limited. The law in France, see
supra note 11, is perhaps the most prominent, although perhaps not the most ambitious.
Consider the project of Bair, Jackson & Rogers mentioned in Manifesto, supra note 19, at 76.
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B. Making Human Rights Protections Legally Effective
and Operationally Likely
With the paradigms in mind, the problems emerge. There are
several. First and most important, workers are suffering and sometimes
dying as they work to produce the goods so enjoyed and so expected
by the prosperous. On this there is general agreement, but the
agreement ends when the conversation becomes more specific, and
this is the second problem: consensus on meaningful standards is
difficult or impossible to achieve. One of the chief problems for
lawyers to solve is this lack of consensus; the law is no stranger to
moving forward despite a lack of complete agreement.31 Another
problem may be a lack of consensus within a particular corporate
context, but the issue may be more a matter of organization and
emphasis than any active disagreement. Still, the corporate politics
may need some careful navigation—hence the attention to
management organization in the paradigm. That work will include an
eye to operations so that corporate policies are not merely nice window
dressing on the corporate website but have some chance at being put
into practice (“operationalized,” in the parlance).
Additionally, and not least, the clauses necessary to make the
protections legally effective are extremely difficult to draft from a
doctrinal standpoint. This difficulty results mainly from the focus of
commercial law on the goods to be produced rather than the
conditions of production.32 That focus, in turn, leads to difficulty with
respect to remedies33 that are geared to workers’ human rights, health,
and safety rather than monetary compensation for defective goods.

31. “[C]ontracts are necessarily incomplete.” Brooks, supra note 17, at 587 n.43.
Even during the most formalistic period, although it required agreement on the same
thing (consensus ad idem), e.g., Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1864), 159 Eng. Rep. 375, 375–
76 (Peerless Case), the common law did not insist on agreement on every possible
detail, which would have been impossible in any case. Further, what agreement there
is may be worthwhile even though it is incompletely theorized and even though the
parties’ reasons may in fact diverge. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary,
Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1737–38 (1995).
32. This issue explains the extensive attention to representations and warranties
and their relation to the goods themselves in the Model Contract Clauses, supra note 2,
¶¶ 1–2. Most importantly, breach of the obligations with respect to workers makes the
goods themselves nonconforming under the MCCs. See id. ¶¶ 2.2 (rejection of goods),
3.1 (buyer’s revocation of acceptance) & 1099 n.29 (defining nonconforming goods).
33. See Jennifer S. Martin’s contribution to this symposium, Private Law Remedies,
Human Rights, and Supply Contracts, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1781(2019).
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In sum, there are multiple problems to be solved: (1) improving the
conditions for workers; (2) crafting agreements in the absence of
consensus; (3) drafting contractual language despite doctrinal gaps
created by a mismatch in focus; (4) finding productive paths through
the corporate political landscape; and (5) making corporate policies
operational instead of aspirational, and certainly not mere window
dressing. Each of these problems is addressed below.
1. Protecting the human rights, health, and safety of workers, and the problem
of moral luck
At first it may seem that not much argument would be necessary on
this score, but three points are worth making. The first is easiest
because it is obvious—too often supply chains are plagued by forced
labor, child labor, or unsafe working conditions. Sometimes the
situation reaches sufficiently horrific levels to draw headlines in
Western media. The second point is that current efforts are
insufficiently effective. The problem is partly due to measures being
ignored too often, either because some companies do not have them
or because other companies have them but do too little to make them
effective. And interestingly, but perhaps controversially, there is an
argument (advanced most forcefully by Provost Richard Locke) that
the kind of measures represented by the MCCs are doomed to tragic
insufficiency because private efforts cannot achieve the goal without
public legal reinforcement.34
First, the worst (but easiest) part: this Article began with the factory
fire that killed over 100 and the building collapse that killed over 1000,
just a few years ago and within easy memory.35 A sizeable literature
documents and considers abuses and tragedies in domestic and
international supply chains.36 The good news on the bad news is that
34. LOCKE, supra note 4, at 17 (authoritative rulemaking, as from a state,
required to solve collective action problems), 18 (“‘[E]nabling rights’ . . . can be
brought to life” only by law), passim.
35. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: THE WORLD’S OTHER ECONOMY (Gordon
Mathews et al. eds., 2012); LAURA HAPKE, SWEATSHOP: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN
IDEA (2004); ROBERT J.S. ROSS, SLAVES TO FASHION: POVERTY AND ABUSE IN THE NEW
SWEATSHOPS (2004); FUNG ET AL., supra note 27. Additional examples of recent
allegations include Annie Kelly, Nestlé Admits Slavery in Thailand While Fighting Child
Labour Lawsuit in Ivory Coast, GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/
sustainable-business/2016/feb/01/nestle-slavery-thailand-fighting-child-labour-lawsu
it-ivory-coast (presenting Nestlé’s instances of forced labor within its supply chains);
Daniela Penha, Slave Labor Found at Starbucks-Certified Brazil Coffee Plantation, MONGABAY
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it makes the news, and thus makes the importance of the issue clear.
In the terms of cognitive biases and behavioral economics, the
information becomes more “available.”37 In this sense it is too bad that
problems do not make the front page more often (although of course
no one wishes for any more tragedies).
Steps taken so far, then, are inadequate. The problem does not arise
for absence of effort; perhaps there is not enough effort, or perhaps
the efforts are insufficiently effective. One of the most salient points
of the factory fire and building collapse was that the particular issues
in the buildings were not unknown. Nor was the knowledge merely
general, along the lines of, “Oh, yes, there are always issues in those
places.” Recent inspections had discovered the problems in the
particular places where the deaths occurred, and the inspections had
found the specific problems—a lack of fire exits in the case of the
factory fire and structural flaws in the case of the building collapse.38
Again, this seems like good news and bad news: the problem of
knowledge has been solved, at least in these cases. The problem of
remediation, however, has not.
Provost Locke’s work argues that a complementary public-private
structure will in any case be necessary to achieve optimal labor
protections.39 The point is intuitive: if public and private players work in
complementary ways on the same problem, presumably the solving power
is at its greatest.40 Some scenarios might be imagined where the public and

(Sept. 18, 2018), https://news.mongabay.com/2018/09/slave-labor-found-atstarbucks-certified-brazil-coffee-plantation (finding slave labor in a Starbucks coffee
bean supplier); Michael Sainato, Accidents at Amazon: Workers Left to Suffer After
Warehouse Injuries, GUARDIAN (July 18, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2018/jul/30/accidents-at-amazon-workers-left-to-suffer-after-wareh
ouse-injuries (revealing numerous instances of workplace injuries in Amazon’s
factories); Martje Theuws & Pauline Overeem, Flawed Fabrics: The Abuse of Girls and
Women Workers in the South Indian Textile Industry, SOMO CTR. RES. MULTINATIONAL
CORPS. 17–30 (2014), http://www.indianet.nl/pdf/FlawedFabrics.pdf (reporting on
women’s labor conditions in five spinning mills: Best Cotton Mills, Jeyavishnu Spintex,
Premier Mills, Sulochana Cotton Spinning Mills, and Super Spinning Mills).
37. E.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 129–30 (2011).
38. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
39. LOCKE, supra note 4, at 12–22 & ch. 7; see also Thomas A. Hemphill & George
O. White III, The World Economic Forum and Nike: Emerging ‘Shared Responsibility’ and
Institutional Control Models for Achieving a Socially Responsible Global Supply Chain?, 1 BUS.
& HUM. RTS. J. 307, 308 (2016).
40. This seems to be much the same point as Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
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private actors work counterproductively, but this seems unlikely, and
Provost Locke’s research suggests that the intuition is borne out
empirically. In the electronics industry, where private efforts are combined
with public ones, the results are better.41 Further, this may not be simply a
matter of better results stemming from more and varied institutional
players working in the same direction. Crucial to understanding Provost
Locke’s argument is the idea that only an authoritative rulemaker can
resolve collective action problems and conflicts of interest.42
This conclusion seems well worth noticing even if at first there is
little that the business lawyer or the supply contract can do about it.
Although a private effort alone is disparaged as second best,43 the claim
does not seem to be that private efforts should not be made. The
argument made by Provost Locke, many NGOs, and labor advocates is
simply that public efforts are also necessary and should not be
discouraged. Indeed, many NGOs have devoted themselves to
advocating for private supply chain management to promote labor
rights, human rights, and the like, both in the traditional manner
contemplated by the MCCs and in newer, “capability building”
initiatives.44 Assuming this argument is correct—that private efforts
alone will achieve less human rights protections than combined private
and public ones—then only so much can be hoped for. Still, second
best is better than nothing, and may be quite a lot better than nothing,
particularly once the goals are considered clearly.
Moreover, remember that Provost Locke, other labor-oriented
scholars, the International Labour Organisation, and many NGOs share
goals (like unionization) that companies like Western Company may not
fully support.45 Further, Western Company has a number of other goals

concurring) (federal power is at its greatest when the President and Congress act in
concert, and less when they do not, particularly when they act in opposition).
41. LOCKE, supra note 4, ch. 7.
42. E.g., id. at 12, 17.
43. Id. at 9.
44. See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); GAY W. SEIDMAN, BEYOND THE
BOYCOTT: LABOR RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM (2007); LOCKE,
supra note 4, at 11, ch. 4.
45. ESBENSHADE, supra note 3, at 12 (“[P]romote workers’ organizing . . . .”);
LOCKE, supra note 4, at 18, 21; ROSS, supra note 36, ch. 9. This Article does not mean
to argue against unionization, but it does recognize the issue as contested in an
international context. For instance, unionization rights and collective bargaining are
recognized and protected by the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151–169. Id. at 78. Internationally, the situation is less clear. Unionization is
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that must be met. So two observations are necessary. First, strategies like
those in the MCCs can only achieve so much, but they still seem worth
pursuing. Second, these criticisms point to next steps that may be more
productive. They may lead, in other words, to Model Contract Clauses 2.0.
There is a different problem with respect to worker health and
safety. Leaving aside the more controversial issues (meaning that
consensus will be difficult or impossible to achieve) like unionization,
the issue of worker health and safety often seems to get less attention—
especially compared to forced labor—despite its obvious importance.
The evil of forced labor should not be minimized, but surely it is at least
as bad for workers to be crushed to death in a building collapse or to be
immolated in a factory fire. Aside from that horrific point, certainly it
does not escape notice that when such events occur, they make front page
news and lead to the outcries and boycotts that could (in theory) decimate
Western Company’s bottom line. So why is it that worker health and safety
seem to get slighted in comparison to forced labor policies?
At first this (apparent) phenomenon is puzzling, and observers of
Western Company’s supply chain management practices may question
whether the observation is correct. But there are reasons. First, in
terms of the legal and compliance practice within Western Company,
forced labor, human trafficking, and child labor are the subject of
numerous laws and regulations that bind Western Company directly.46
Violations could lead to civil47 and potentially criminal liability for
Western Company, depending on various detailed facts of what
happened and how, as well as the seizure of its products by federal
agents.48 Even under laws that require disclosure of supply chain
practices rather than prohibiting certain practices,49 child labor,

protected by article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but that is a
nonbinding instrument. And while the right is also protected by article 8 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the United States
has not ratified that instrument.
46. See, e.g., Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7112
(2012); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–1592 (2012) (criminal sanctions for forced labor,
trafficking, and peonage); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2013
(TVPRA) (Title XII of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub.
L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (2013)).
47. The first private cause of action under the TVPRA was settled recently. See
Stipulation of Dismissal, Sorihin v. Nguyen, No. 16-5422 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2018).
48. Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA), Pub. L. No.
114-125, 130 Stat. 122 (2016).
49. E.g., California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 (TSCA), CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1714.43 (West 2010) (effective Jan. 1, 2012).
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forced labor, or trafficking could easily result in liability for Western
Company itself as it is unlikely to have made any required disclosures
about such practices in its supply chain.50 Since Western Company is
large and has global reach, the laws under which it will find itself in
deep trouble are nearly innumerable.51 Small wonder that Western
Company pays close attention to these matters. Western Company also
pays close attention to conflict minerals because of the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission rule on such matters.52 Energy is also
focused on what the law of the European Union requires with respect
to conflict minerals.53 In other words, and entirely predictably, the
attention of Western Company is focused on legal compliance
requirements that apply directly to it.
While this explains why the general counsel of Western Company is
concerned with forced labor, child labor, human trafficking, and to a
degree, conflict minerals, the question remains as to why worker health
and safety seem to receive less concentrated attention. Perhaps the
answer has two parts. First, Western Company is not itself bound by
50. See, e.g., id. (outlining retailers’ duty to disclose efforts to eradicate slavery and
human trafficking from direct supply chain for tangible goods).
51. See, e.g., Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30 (UK); French Corporate Duty of
Vigilance Law, Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des
sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-399 of March 27, 2017
on the duty of vigilence of parent companies and contractors], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], Mar. 28, 2017; Directive 2014/95/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive
2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information by
Certain Large Undertakings and Groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 1.
52. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13p-1 (2018). Part of the rule was held unconstitutional.
See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (invalidating the rule
on the grounds that it violated the First Amendment to the extent it required entities
to report to the Commission and to state on their websites that any of their products
have “not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free’”). Other parts remain in force in at
least some sense, Keith F. Higgins, Statement on the Effect of the Recent Court of Appeals
Decision on the Conflict Minerals Rule, SEC (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/
public-statement/2014-spch042914kfh, although the public statement of Acting
Chairman Michael S. Piwowar says that “it is difficult to conceive of a circumstance that
would counsel in favor of [the SEC] enforcing” the U.S. conflict minerals rules.
Michael S. Piwowar, Statement of Acting Chairman Piwowar on the Court of Appeals Decision
on the Conflict Minerals Rule, SEC (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/piwowar-statement-court-decision-conflict-minerals-rule.
53. See generally Enrico Partiti & Steffan Van der Velde, Curbing Supply-Chain Human
Rights Violations Through Trade and Due Diligence. Possible WTO Concerns Raised by the EU
Conflict Minerals Regulation, 51 J. WORLD TRADE 1043 (2017) (assessing the EU
regulatory strategy for supply chain due diligence obligations and provisions of WTO
law regarding minerals regulation).
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laws relating to worker health and safety. The workers are employees
of the subcontractors of FTS, or perhaps FTS itself, but they are not
employees of Western Company. Further, they are subject to health
and safety laws in a faraway country.54 Assuming that there are
violations, then, they are violations of laws of a different jurisdiction
from Western Company, and those laws apply to different companies
(i.e., FTS or subcontractors, but not Western Company). In short,
violations of those laws do not subject Western Company to liability, at
least not in any obvious way, and certainly they are little threat
compared to violations of U.S. laws that apply expressly to Western
Company.55 This is a practical as well as a legal explanation for why
worker health and safety may receive less attention at Western
Company. Western Company has no compliance obligation itself.
There is another reason too, which is practical and moral rather
than practical and legal. Much regulation of worker health and safety
requires measures that, with luck, will never be put to use. For
instance, adequate and unlocked fire exits are necessary only if there
is a fire (to state the matter simply). As long as there is no urgent need
to evacuate, ordinary exits are perfectly adequate. In other words, they
function like insurance functions: one only “needs” fire insurance if
there is a fire. To be sure, not all regulation of worker health and safety
works this way: some violations are likely to cause serious and
immediate harm (e.g., exposure to dangerous glues or other toxic
chemicals), and violating those regulations would be an evil in itself,
or malum in se to use the formulation of the criminal law. Something
like fire exits, however, is subject to the vagaries of moral luck. As long
as there is no fire, everything is fine (sort of), and Western Company
has not done anything terrible.
To understand the concept of moral luck better,56 consider an
example. If I leave the baby in the bath with the water running to fetch
54. Most often supply chain contracts simply require subcontractors to obey local
law. See LOCKE, supra note 4, at 19.
55. For a more detailed and nuanced consideration of potential liability, see
Ramona L. Lampley’s contribution to this symposium, Mitigating Risk, Eradicating
Slavery, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1707 (2019).
56. For the basic ideas, see generally THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS ch. 3
(1979); Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 57 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993);
BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK (1981); Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK
35 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993); Bernard Williams, Postscript, in MORAL LUCK 251 (Daniel
Statman ed., 1993). For a consideration in legal contexts, see generally John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123
(2007); Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Luck: The Moral Basis of Strict Liability, 104 LAW
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a toy downstairs, and then I become distracted while the tub fills, and
the baby drowns, I have done something terrible. I have not murdered
my child, but I have killed her, and I will bear the moral responsibility for
having caused her death by my negligence (at least). On the other hand,
if the baby is perfectly fine and is sitting happily in the bathwater when I
am struck by my error and run, panic stricken, up the stairs, then I have
been careless, but I have not done anything terrible. I have not killed my
child. At least so it would seem,57 and this is often our experience.
To translate this idea and experience to the supply chain context: if
Western Company traffics in persons, it is committing evil practices,
and the same is arguably true if the trafficking is performed by
subcontractors in the supply chain. (The latter situation will receive
more attention below, as there are a variety of issues, like remoteness,
causation, and knowledge or intent, that make the moral situation less
clear.) Trafficking is not subject to moral luck. If Western Company
does not provide adequate unlocked fire exits, and there is no need
for them as things turn out, the moral situation is less clear because
Western Company has been morally lucky. The concept of moral luck
is the philosophical equivalent of “no harm, no foul.”
For many reasons, then, Western Company may be less concerned
with worker health and safety than with trafficking. Cognitive biases,
and particularly the availability of information coupled with an
optimism bias, may reinforce this.58 Likely thinking goes like this:
“While there have been factory fires and building collapses in
Bangladesh, and in New York a century ago,59 those are distant and
unlikely events. They will not happen with our subcontractors in
Thailand or Costa Rica (or wherever). We need to be attentive, and duly
diligent, of course—but trafficking is an issue that everyone is talking
Q. REV. 530 (1988). For a consideration of the ideas in the context of contract law, see
Aditi Bagchi, Managing Moral Risk: The Case of Contract, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1878 (2011).
57. As should now be apparent, how to assess my moral standing with
philosophical rigor in these two situations is a problem. Should my moral standing
really be so different because I have been lucky or unlucky? In addition to Nagel and
the sources just cited, consider, for example, NICHOLAS RESCHER, Moral Luck, in
Statman, supra note 56, at 141; Brynmor Browne, A Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck,
42 PHIL. Q. 345, 351 (1992); Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Luck and the Virtues of
Impure Agency, 22 METAPHILOSOPHY 14 (1991). But there is little if any disagreement
that my experience, my understanding of my moral situation, and society’s
understanding of it will differ quite markedly between the two situations.
58. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 37, at 249–52.
59. See, e.g., Mark C. Niles, Punctuated Equilibrium: A Model for Administrative Evolution,
44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 353, 379–92 (2011) (discussing the Triangle Factory fire).
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about, that is featured in signs in airports and restrooms, and subject to
a serious legal regime not unlike drug enforcement.” The individuals
who run Western Company will probably see things this way; trafficking
involves an evil act that should not be done. That the company might
not get caught is a small consolation, as there is real harm. That various
code violations take place with respect to worker health and safety is a
bit of a problem, but not a big one so long as nothing bad happens. The
violation is not evil in itself. And this intuition is reinforced by the
knowledge of experienced individuals that the best Western factories,
and indeed headquarters buildings, in the most developed countries,
will have any number of building code violations. And the same is true
for these individuals’ homes—even the CEO’s lavish residence no doubt
has any number of building code violations if anyone were to look for
them. So health and safety do not get the same priority.
2. Crafting agreements in the absence of consensus
There are two sets of problems here. One is that the actors in the
developed world do not agree on the human rights standards that ought
to apply. Partly this might be characterized easily, and largely accurately,
as political, and some of this may be a matter of status. Management can
be expected to hold different views from labor. But partly the matter is
one of background, upbringing, and the like, for these are moral
opinions, and they may well vary based on geography. In a rural setting
where children in farming families routinely “help with chores,” i.e., work
on the farm, general views on child labor may vary considerably from
those held in the affluent suburbs in large metropolitan areas.60
With geography, status, and socioeconomic context in mind, the second
set of problems should be quite apparent: views and priorities may differ
considerably between the developed world and developing countries.
What may seem like immoral exploitation could also seem like economic
opportunity that is far better than the alternatives. On top of this are
arguments about protectionism, which always lurks in such discussions. It
is easy to see how imposing environmental, labor, or similar standards, thus
raising costs of production in the developing world, will result in protection
for industries in the developed world. This phenomenon has been dubbed

60. M. Neil Browne et al., Universal Moral Principles and the Law: The Failure of OneSize-Fits-All Child Labor Laws, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2004) (recognizing different
perspectives on child labor and arguing that policymakers should avoid “imposing a
universal moral vision upon other groups in situations as emotionally, economically,
culturally, and developmentally complex as that of child labor”).
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the New Protectionism, and there is no shortage of literature and argument.61
While most of the discussion centers on environmental standards,62 the
same arguments can and have been made with respect to labor standards.63
Free trade advocates generally see these sorts of standards as non-tariff
barriers to trade,64 and while some make serious efforts at reconciling
environmental and labor protections with the benefits of free trade,65 there
is no doubt that at least in theory labor and environmental protections will
also have a trade protectionist valence. In such situations, the effort to raise
labor standards in developing countries may hurt workers more than it helps
them, as the argument goes.66 And even those sympathetic to raising

61. Indeed, there appear to be at least two pieces entitled The New Protectionism,
including Carl J. Green’s from 1981, 3 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1 (discussing “bilateralism”
and “legal protectionism” as forms of new protectionism), and Moira L. McConnell’s The
New Protectionism and Environmental Barriers to Trade Liberalization: Assessing the Bona Fides of
Government Action, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 43 (1993) (examining whether environmental
regulation can constitute either a trade barrier or a subsidy, and whether an adjudicator
can go beyond the face of the legislation and assess the bona fides of a state’s legislation).
62. See, e.g., Seymour J. Rubin, A Predominantly Commercial Policy Perspective, in ENVIRONMENT
AND TRADE: THE RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 3 (Seymour J.
Rubin & Thomas R. Graham eds., 1982) (noting that pollution control requires higher
production costs, resulting in less competitive goods); Don P. Clark, The Greening of
Protectionism—Industry and Environmental Coalitions to Oppose Trade Pacts, 19 WORLD COMPETITION
L. & ECON. REV. 105 (1995); McConnell, supra note 61, at 45.
63. See generally Lance Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in International
Trade, 25 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 165 (1993); Amit Dasgupta, Labour Standards and
WTO: A New Form of Protectionism, 1 S. ASIA ECON. J. 113 (2000); Brian A. Langille, Eight
Ways to Think About International Labour Standards, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 27 (1997); Benn
Steil, ‘Social Correctness’ is the New Protectionism, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 14 (1994).
64. See Labour Standards: Consensus, Coherence and Controversy, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey5_e.htm (last visited June
1, 2019) (“[E]fforts to bring labour standards into the arena . . . are little more than a
smokescreen for protectionism.”); see also Compa, supra note 63, at 187 (“[T]he labor
rights argument is just a cover for blocking exports . . . “); Dasgupta, supra note 63, at
124 (“[T]rade restrictive policies based on humanitarian considerations were . . . camouflage
for . . . protectionism.”); Moonhawk Kim, Disguised Protectionism and Linkages to the GATT/WTO,
64 WORLD POL. 426 (2012) (states impose labor regulations that purposefully restrict
international trade, but with the appearance of an acceptable domestic policy).
65. Frank Emmert, Labor, Environmental Standards and World Trade Law, 10 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT’L L. POL’Y 75 (2003); McConnell, supra note 61.
66. See Gary Burtless, Workers’ Rights: Labor Standards and Global Trade, BROOKINGS
(Sept. 1, 2001), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/workers-rights-labor-standardsand-global-trade; Stephen S. Golub, Are International Labor Standards Needed to Prevent
Social Dumping?, 34 FIN. & DEV. 20 (1997).
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standards for working conditions recognize the strong link to antiglobalization.67
So even within the same developed society, people of good will differ
on how best to address these issues. Further, there can even be
disagreement on the issues themselves, as with child labor. Everyone is
against child labor—put in those terms. But they are not necessarily
against a fifteen-year-old spending time working on the family farm if he
is not missing school at the time. The United States permits quite a lot
of child labor, despite serious injuries to some of those child workers.68
Outside the developed world, a child who works may be a child who is
better nourished and whose family has prospects; that child may have
no meaningful opportunity to go to school anyway; and the question
may not be whether the child works but where and in what conditions.
This lack of consensus is exacerbated by rhetoric that can hide areas
of substantial agreement. Not all human rights violations are the same,
either practically or morally. Death and crippling injury are worse than
very long working hours and a six- or seven-day workweek. We hesitate
to make these judgments, and the examples can be manipulated to
turn them around, but recognizing differences of degree can help
because it can allow second-best solutions where first-best solutions—
much less ideal ones—are impossible. It is useful to think of a spectrum
of problematic issues ranging from the worst—such as death, slavery, or
forced labor—to the controversial and arguably reprehensible that are
nevertheless not as bad as death. Candor is helpful for closing deals and
for achieving some consensus. If all can agree that forced labor should
be eradicated from the supply chain, regardless of the indifference of
public authorities, then there ought to be forward movement with
respect to that issue. That deal can be closed. If there is disagreement
with respect to some other issue, and no deal can be closed on it, then
we have to take what we can get.69
67. Richard A. Greenwald, Labor, Liberals, and Sweatshops, in SWEATSHOP USA: THE
AMERICAN SWEATSHOP IN HISTORICAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 77, 77 (Daniel E. Bender
& Richard A. Greenwald eds., 2003) (“[I]n fact, the current antisweatshop movement
is intimately connected to the anti-globalization movement.”); see also GLOBALIZATION
FROM BELOW: THE WORLD’S OTHER ECONOMY (Gordon Mathews et al. eds., 2012).
68. See supra note 8.
69. Unionization and collective bargaining rights require careful observation and
thought. Theoretically, they may be separate from, say, issues of forced labor or health
and safety. If a contractual regime may help improve matters with respect to forced
labor and worker safety, it probably ought to be pursued, even if it does not lead to
unionization rights. This argument sees the issues as independent, or at least separate.
On the other hand, either theoretically or empirically, achieving significant
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As it turns out, there is plenty of room for agreement, and a serious
desire to make the situation better. Those facts have been the force
carrying forward the MCCs. Whatever can be agreed goes into the
standards for a particular contract, or (more likely, we hope) in all the
contracts for a particular company. The MCCs do not attempt a “one
size fits all” prescription. In any event, a company that wants such a set
of standards can choose from already existing offerings.70 In short, the
company can choose whatever standards it likes.
Visualizing how this might work can be helpful.71 The first idea,
which involves just the company’s own policies, might be considered
one-dimensional. The policy may or may not include a commitment
that is legally enforceable, but it is in any case a single point. When
the company requires its suppliers to commit to protecting human
rights, then the commitments might be considered two-dimensional:
the policies adopted by one company—a single point—branch out
across a plane of suppliers, and perhaps their suppliers and contractors
as well. There is thus a web of commitments, but they all originate at
the single point of the buyer who has required the commitments
through the supply chains that are part of its business. See Figure 1.72

improvement with respect to forced labor and worker safety (for example) may be
impossible without unions that will protect workers. In other words, unionization
rights may be “enabling rights” that allow workers to improve their rights against
forced labor and unsafe working conditions. See LOCKE, supra note 4, at 18. In the
end, though, Provost Locke’s empirical argument seems most tightly linked to public
protections for workers—in combination with private protections. See id. at 17 passim.
These public protections may protect unionization among other things. In any case,
the evidence suggests that private compliance is well worth pursuing, and this
conclusion holds even if private compliance alone is insufficient to lead to significant
improvements. Private efforts are a part of the solution, and the MCCs aim to allow
companies to pursue that part effectively.
70. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text (discussing the UN Guiding
Principles and other efforts).
71. The following is discussed in DAVIES & SNYDER, supra note 16, at 239–42.
72. Thanks to Adrian Simion for help with the figures for this Article.
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Figure 1: Two-Dimensional Model

A more complex and interesting three-dimensional model might also be
visualized. A company (call it Buyer A) might belong to an organization
(like the Fair Labor Association or the Worker Rights Consortium) that sets
standards, audits compliance, and probably provides a label or a
certification mark or a seal of approval to show consumers that the products
are sustainable, or free of forced labor and child labor, and the like.73 It
73. See Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in Global Commerce,
33 J. CORP. L. 325 (2008). For a thorough consideration of labeling in this regard, see
WORKERS’ RIGHTS AND LABOR COMPLIANCE IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS: IS A SOCIAL LABEL
THE ANSWER? (Jennifer Bair et al. eds., 2014).
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may require its suppliers and their suppliers and subcontractors to belong
as well. But other companies (Buyers B and C, for example) may also
belong to the organization and require their suppliers, and their suppliers
and subcontractors, to belong. Thus, many companies (consider Buyers A,
B, and C) and their respective suppliers and subcontractors belong to a
single organization—so the branches are not limited to a single plane or
web of supply chains but multiple webs on multiple planes. Many of the
members of the organization are not linked contractually to each other at
all. This model can be visualized as a pyramid, with the standard-setting
organization (like FLA or WRC) at the apex, with below that a plane of
Western buyers (A, B, and C), and below that their suppliers (first tiers),
and below that further suppliers and subcontractors. See Figure 2.
Figure 2: Three-Dimensional Model
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The three-dimensional model is interesting not only for its
complexity but also for its function and polity. First, it might be argued
that the standard-setting organization here, as elsewhere, serves a
lawmaking function. The organization sets rules that are binding for
many parties. To be sure they are in some sense voluntary rather than
mandatory, but in practice they are not especially more voluntary than
many default or suppletive rules, and in many contexts, they are
considerably less voluntary (i.e., they are more nearly mandatory for
those who want to do business in a particular industry). The rules serve
much the same function as law, although they are privately made
rules.74 The polity adds further interest. Notably, each standardsetting organization is extraterritorial. Further, there can be—and
there are in fact—multiple competing organizations. If we assume for
a moment the validity of the first argument, i.e., that each organization
is like a private lawmaker, then we can see that with competing
lawmakers a little federalist system arises. This private regulatory
competition has many of the same features as public regulatory
competition, or federalism. In short, a company may choose a probusiness, pro-employer standard setter (for obvious reasons), or a
company may choose a pro-labor organization (e.g., because of labor
pressure, or from public, NGO, or competitive pressure, or for
protectionist reasons),75 or it may choose a lax standard-setter, and so
on—just as a corporation may choose to incorporate in Ohio, or New
York, or Delaware, or elsewhere.76
A company might therefore choose a two- or three-dimensional
model, or both, depending on its views on particular standards.
Despite the absence of more general consensus, and regardless of
disagreements on various issues, the parties can arrange their own legal
regimes through the institution of contract, sometimes simply in a web
of two-party contracts and sometimes in much more complex ways. It
74. This kind of argument is considered at length in a different context in David
V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371 (2003). For a recent consideration,
see Steven L. Schwarcz, Soft Law as Governing Law, 104 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3307418.
75. Conventionally the FLA is associated with the first characterization (pro-buyer)
and the WRC with the second (pro-labor). See, e.g., ESBENSHADE, supra note 3, at ch. 7,
and particularly at 12, 183 (noting an NGO parody of the FLA with a “Sweatwash” socalled award). Other forms of corporate organization, even ones that provide for
contractual liability for Western buyers, have been criticized for allowing further
whitewashing. See generally Salminen, supra note 27.
76. This kind of argument is considered in David V. Snyder, Molecular Federalism
and the Structures of Private Lawmaking, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 419 (2007).
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is all an effort to make the standards on which they agree legally
binding—provided they can solve the doctrinal issues through careful
drafting. That is the subject of the next section.
3. Drafting legally effective clauses
The doctrinal problems and drafting challenges are considerable.
There is a mismatch between the applicable law, which centers on
goods, and the goals at the forefront here, which center on people.
The mismatch has its greatest effect on the related issues of warranties
or quality obligations; breach; remedies; and mitigation.77 In addition,
further obstacles arise from U.S. tort and statutory law. The goal of the
MCCs is to navigate this trap-laden landscape as well as possible.
The first difficulty can be summed up in one horrific phrase: Child
slaves might make great soccer balls. The balls may well be fit for their
ordinary purpose (playing soccer) or their ultimate buyers’ particular
purposes. Although it is true that a Western company buying the balls
for resale may find the balls unfit for that company’s purpose—
resale—the balls are unfit only if their method of manufacture
becomes public, and the businesses involved have every economic
incentive to assure that such information never becomes public.
Absent careful drafting, then, soccer balls made by child slaves may
breach no obligations of quality, at least not in the usual sense.
Even assuming that the contract contains adequate provisions about
the conditions in which the balls are produced, a host of remedial
problems then arise, both legal and practical. Is there a fundamental
breach78 or the like,79 allowing termination of the contract, if the balls
are perfectly good (in some sense) for playing soccer? Again, assuming
proper drafting to allow termination, what other remedies are then
appropriate? Damages are problematic; again, the balls will sell for full
value unless the nature of their production becomes public.
On a related and even more troublesome note, the buyer is under a
duty to mitigate (very strongly and widely under U.S. law80 and also
under international law).81 This may be another reason for a buyer not
to disclose the conditions of production. And mitigation could
77. See Martin, supra note 33.
78. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, art. 25, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 59 [hereinafter CISG].
79. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-612 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also
U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a).
81. CISG art. 77.
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arguably require resale of the goods. If the tainted methods of
manufacture have become known, however, reselling the goods could
do grave reputational damage to the buyer, although the extent of that
damage may not be quantifiable with reasonable certainty.82 Given this
problem, the buyer may be able to argue that refusing to resell the
goods in these unusual circumstances is actually a step toward
mitigation, and indeed, this is the approach of the MCCs.83 Although
such a stance is open to question in terms of mitigation, resale may
sometimes be prohibited under some laws, as when forced or
indentured labor is involved.84
But not all situations are so
straightforward; public law tends to be quite narrow in scope, so if the
violations by the supplier are related to health and safety (causing
building collapses and factory fires and thus injury and death, but not
forced labor), public law would not necessarily protect the buyer’s
refusal to resell. Some might think that the best course of action for the
buyer would be to donate the goods to a charity like the Boys and Girls
Clubs. Arguably this helps prevent reputational harm and is thus a step
toward mitigation (although there are obvious counterarguments); but
again, if forced labor is involved, public law would prevent donation and
would require return of the goods.85
From this point the remedial problems only become further
complicated. Many of the damages and mitigation issues could be of
purely speculative interest because many potential defendants will be
unable to respond in damages, even if they are subject to suit. Specific
performance is no more promising, at least as a coercive remedy. It
will frequently be unavailable under U.S. law86 or other common law

82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352.
83. Model Contract Clauses, supra note 2, ¶ 5.5(b) & 1104 n.45.
84. Federal law prohibits resale when the goods are made by forced labor. See
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (2012) (“All goods, wares, articles, and
merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign
country by convict labor or/and forced labor or/and indentured labor under penal
sanctions shall not be entitled to entry at any of the ports of the United States, and the
importation thereof is hereby prohibited . . . .”); see also Trade Facilitation and Trade
Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, § 910, 130 Stat. 122, 239 (2016)
(repealing the consumptive demand exception from § 307 of the Tariff Act).
85. See id.
86. See generally U.C.C. § 2-716 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). For an
insightful consideration of the issues around specific performance and injunctions,
including the value of such clauses even when relief may not be available, see Jonathan
C. Lipson, Something Else: Specific Relief for Breach of Human Rights Terms in Supply Chain
Agreements, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1751 (2019).
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systems87 because theoretically damages may be an adequate remedy
and equitable relief might arguably be unnecessary. And aside from
the extraordinary nature of equitable relief in common law systems,
even civil law systems and international tribunals are likely to deny
relief that cannot practically be achieved.88
Regardless of the interesting legal and equitable issues, it would appear
that most who are involved in this field do not consider damages, specific
performance, or even termination to be the best responses in most
situations (although termination may be required in some instances
where the suppliers are beyond hope). Rather, remediation—helping
the supplier to comply with the required principles—generally seems
preferable. A termination, after all, may leave the workers in even worse
shape. Consider an inquiry after the scandals of the 1990s:
Caroline Lequesne of Oxfam, a British charity, has just returned
from Bangladesh, where she visited factories to determine the
impact of American retailers’ human-rights policies. She reckons
that between 1993 and 1994 around 30,000 of the 50,000 children
working in textile firms in Bangladesh were thrown out of factories
because suppliers feared losing their business if they kept the
children on. But the majority of these children have, because of
penury, been forced to turn to prostitution or other industries like
welding, where conditions pose far greater risks to them.89

Remediation is more a matter of commercial relationships and
economic leverage, and while law may be relevant, it plays a tertiary
role. For example, high switching costs will push buyers strongly
toward remediation rather than termination for purely economic
reasons in addition to the human and moral reasons just outlined in
the Oxfam inquiry. This will be true even when buyers have high
degrees of leverage over the suppliers. Still, the bargaining position
for the buyer who is pushing for remediation can be buttressed by
appropriate contract drafting, as reflected in the MCCs.90 The point
87. See generally John P. Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany, 57 MICH.
L. REV. 495, 495–96 (1959) (common law became a system “committed to damages as
its mode of relief,” although specific performance could be available in a few instances
or when damages are inadequate).
88. See Soinco v. NKAP, Zürich Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Award ZHK
273/95 (May 31, 1996), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960531s1.html (considering
Swiss and Russian law as well as the CISG).
89. Ethical Shopping: Human Rights, 335 ECONOMIST 58, 58 (1995).
90. The phrasing in the text is purposely vague because the best contract-drafting
strategy in this context poses an interesting question of contract design that is outside
the scope of this Article. The party with greater bargaining power may prefer a straight
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becomes finer when considering the practical context: frequently the
violation will be apparent only in recordkeeping. The obvious question
then becomes whether the violations are confined to bookkeeping
practices or instead reflect serious issues with working conditions, human
trafficking, or other issues. And there is a world of difference between the
two, with the gravest human cost hanging in the balance.
These issues are not the usual stock-in-trade of commercial lawyers;
controlling clients’ exposure, however, is more familiar, and it is just
as necessary here. Certainly, moral obligations and, to some degree,
legal requirements push companies and their lawyers to do what they
can to protect workers in international supply chains. But this is not a
riskless task, and companies in some respects face increased exposure
when they attempt to improve supply chain conditions but fail to be
sufficiently effective. Some potential liability sounds fundamentally in
tort, although some of the theories are statutory or even contractual.
Plaintiffs have pressed claims of negligence, deceptive advertising, and
trafficking, as well as suits under the Alien Tort Statute. They have also
asserted third-party beneficiary theories. Defendants have for the most
part prevailed, often reasonably easily, but some cases are going forward
still, and companies are understandably nervous about the potential for
liability as the suits move into discovery and further phases of litigation.91
termination clause in the contract even if that party contemplates addressing defaults
through much more constructive, relationship-preserving measures. See generally Lisa
Bernstein, Merchant Law in Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796–97 (1996). To take a common example,
a bank may draft its loan documents to allow it to call the loan (demanding immediate
repayment in full) even if in many circumstances it will give borrowers a second or
third chance and will indeed have a whole “Workouts” department devoted to
administering loans that are in default. Of course, if circumstances dictate a different
course, the termination (or in the loan context, acceleration) clause can be invoked
by the bank, triggering the “end-game norms” instead of the “relationship-preserving
norms.” See id. Similarly, a Western buyer in a supply chain relationship may prefer a
termination clause even though it contemplates remediation of human rights
problems rather than outright termination (except in the most hopeless or egregious
circumstances). Alternatively, the supply contract may be better designed if it reflects
expectations more closely, providing for remediation in most circumstances rather
than termination. The contract might do so by providing for a notice of default
followed by a period during which the supplier is allowed (and helped) to cure the
default. If the cure is successful, the contract remains in place. The MCCs give parties
both options. It provides for termination in ¶ 2.3, supra note 2, at 1099, but points out
the benefits (as well as the drawbacks) of a notice-and-cure mechanism, id. at 1100
n.30. Which course is better presents an intriguing issue for further exploration.
91. These issues and the litigation associated with them are discussed thoroughly
in Lampley, supra note 55.
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Concern stems particularly from the trenchant observation of Judge
Johnston that current tort doctrine encourages Western buyers to
divorce themselves from the supply chain as much as possible and to
“ignore[ ] workplace safety” as a means to “escape liability.”92 Judge
Johnston remarks on the law’s perversion of public policy, noting that
“the better rule would be to encourage general contractors to take all
reasonable measures to ensure the safety of all workers . . . .”93 Judge
Johnston’s point is a salient call for law reform; it is also a warning bell
for companies who want to encourage health and safety in their supply
chains. The MCCs attempt to manage this kind of exposure through
appropriate disclaimers, but disclaimers can only go so far, and
companies that are subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation
probably cannot use many of them.94
4.

Aiming for operational likelihood in the corporate political landscape
Part of the impetus for the MCCs is a recognition of corporate
politics; another part is a desire to reach toward operational
implementation in addition to formal adoption. To understand,
consider Chris Johnson’s eloquent argument that business lawyers are
uniquely well situated to achieve corporate change with respect to
human rights protections.95 The general counsel often sits on the
board or at least has a seat at board meetings; this is an important part
of the paradigm. The general counsel will be close to the CEO, and
they will strategize together, typically forming a common vision. The
two working together are in a good position to put forward helpful
policies for adoption by the board, and once they become policies,
they can be implemented through the procedures and routines used
to implement other corporate policies.
Alternatively, however, once the policies are adopted, they can
languish. They may be recorded in corporate minutes, where they will
never see the light of day, or they may be advertised through the

92. Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. N15C-07-174 MMJ, 2016 WL 2616375, at
*9 n.68 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016). The complaint was originally filed in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia and it named Bangladesh as a
defendant, (No. 15-CV-00619-KBJ (D.D.C. filed Apr. 23, 2015)).
93. Id.
94. See Model Contract Clauses, supra note 2, ¶ 5.7; FAR § 52.222–56(c) (2018)
(requiring contractor certification (within threshold limits) that requires the
contractor to “monitor, detect, and terminate the contract with a subcontractor or
agent engaging in prohibited activities”).
95. Johnson, supra note 7.
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corporate web site, where they may do more good. But the paradigm
assumed above suggests that for better implementation, the policies
need to make it into the supply contracts themselves. On the website
the policies may be simply aspirational, inspirational, or marketing.
On the other hand, the contracts in the paradigm are used by Western
Company for planning and management of its supply chains. The
factories where the goods are made use the contracts—particularly
their schedules or appendixes—to make the goods and to comply with
their various obligations to Western Company, not only with respect to
manufacturing, but also with respect to timing, quality control, IP
protection—and now, we hope, human rights protections. A key part
of the strategy behind the MCCs is to put the standards—whatever they
are (on fire exits, forced labor, recordkeeping, and so on)—into the
operational part of the transaction, where they will be seen and used
by the supervisors in the factories, and perhaps by some of the workers
as well (depending on how the manufacturing process is structured).
Another strategy behind the MCCs is to focus the attention of the
general counsel. It might be too easy for Western Company to assign
these tasks to the CSR department and then to leave the matter there.
Because the supply contracts in which the MCCs will be included are
under the supervision of the general counsel and not just the CSR
department, the general counsel will need to be conversant with the
basic issues. Between the contractual piece and the compliance pieces
arising from various legislation,96 these issues will be part of the
portfolio of the general counsel, who can help keep these matters from
being shunted too far aside. Paying attention to human rights
becomes part of what the company will need to do, legally, because of
its own contracts. This provides a concrete way for policies to be
implemented and routinized and not simply to languish unseen
among other corporate policies or to be plastered prettily but
ineffectively on the corporate website.
In short, a contractual approach is meant to garner attention from
corporate actors who have the power to implement policies, as well as
to put those policies in a place where they can make a difference—not
just at the corporate headquarters or on the corporate website. In the
end, the strategy of focusing on the contract follows the simple maxim
of many who have experience in what the corporate world calls
Purchasing: “The purchase order is king.” If the purchase order is king,
then the standards need to be in the purchase order. That such a
96. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text.
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quotidian point could potentially carry so much operational weight is
telling: it is the everyday routine that will enable goals to be
operationalized. Practical results come from paying attention to actual
practice. That is no less true here, where the technical legalese and
operational outlook of the MCCs provide an avenue for moral
attentiveness. That idea brings us to the next section.
II. THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACTS IN INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS
Perhaps it is surprising that simple matters of everyday routine and
grimy details of operations can carry such moral weight. Supply
contracts would seem to be a far cry from the high and ancient theory
of the political philosophers. But this Article suggest that these
mundane but large matters resonate with some of the classical ideas of
the social contract. This section does not attempt a thorough
consideration, which has engendered untold volumes over several
centuries. But this Article sketches a particular view of social contracts
and attempts to place these supply chain agreements under that
rubric. To be clear, supply contracts that aim (among other things) to
protect the human rights, health, and safety of workers are not the
same as or a substitute for the singular social contract as classically
theorized. Still, these international supply chain contracts supplement
the classical social contract, and they share important virtues and goals
with it: they attempt to organize a complex cooperative arrangement
that has moral and social aspects as well as economic ones. But these
supply contracts have moved forward into contemporary society and
economics. They recognize and harness the power of multinational
enterprises, not just nation-states and individuals. And they are
transnational, crossing (and largely ignoring) geographic boundaries,
making them in many ways extraterritorial. Before reaching these
points, though, it will be best to begin at the beginning.
A. Thinking in Classical Terms
The theory of the social contract, as understood here, is that
members of society need to organize themselves to enable cooperation
and thus to improve their lives. Contract (writ large) is the appropriate
vehicle; contract is the device through which persons, by the exercise
of their will or their consent, arrange their relationships with others.
The contract is a creation of persons; it is not imposed upon them. So
in the first instance, it is organizational and enables cooperation.
Further, the contracts are motivated by self-interest. In modern terms,
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the contract creates value; it gives the parties to the contract something
they want that they would not otherwise have enjoyed. The making of
a social contract is a moral or normative act, and the contract itself is a
moral and normative artifact. The making of the contract recognizes
other parties and their interests; it effectuates the will of the
contracting parties, fulfilling in some measure their desires; and the
contract establishes acceptable future action (or norms). Typically the
social contract includes assumed norms thought to be self-evident, so obvious
as to be thought part of the natural order; these are often denominated
natural rights. They may be so obvious that they remain unstated but are
nevertheless important to be recognized, naturally, and perhaps legally.
So far, this description characterizes both ordinary contracts and
social contracts. The difference is that the traditional social contract is
conceived as existing between persons who come together to establish
law in order to achieve justice, as in Plato;97 to justify a Sovereign as with
Hobbes98 or a government as with John Locke;99 or (less practically) a
small democracy, as with Rousseau.100 These ideas are justifications and
descriptions of the foundation of the state. For the most part these
writers were thinking about the theory of government and the
foundation of the state at the advent of the modern notion of states,
considered both domestically and internationally, the latter typically
pegged to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This so-called Westphalian
system assumes territoriality, the current challenge to which is
internationalism (denoting the idea that rulemaking and governance
should be on an international level, often involving international
organizations like the UN), globalization (denoting a global marketplace

97. PLATO, supra note 29, perhaps published in the late 370s B.C.E. The Greek (at
359a) δικαιοσύνη or τὸ δίκαιον is rendered justice, which is achieved through “laws”
(νόμοι) and “contracts” (Allen) or “covenants” (Paul Shorey trans. 1930 in Loeb ed.,
vol. 1) or compacts (translating ξυνθήκαι), etymologically, things that are put together.
Similarly, etymologically covenant suggests a coming together, or a compact suggests
promising together, or a contract suggests drawing together. For the English
etymology, see the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY entries.
98. 2 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 165 (1651) (G.A.J. Rogers & Karl Schuhmann
eds., 2003).
99. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. 8, ¶ 97 (1698), in TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Mark Goldie ed., 1993).
100. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT in BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS
bk. 2, ch. 9 (Donald A. Cress trans., 1987).
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and a global economic order), and the corporate power of
multinational enterprises (which should be obvious).101
This Article suggests that in this new order a new kind of social
contract is necessary, not to supplant the social contract expounded by
the classical theorists, but to supplement it. A globalized order needs
a contract that transcends sovereign nations or geographical
boundaries, and it must involve business enterprises as well as natural
persons, governments, sovereigns, or even bodies-politic. The new
social contracts do not involve or constitute a state, but they are social
contracts nonetheless. They are social in that they address social needs,
possibly because of self-interest but also for moral reasons. Indeed,
they are social because they express and seek to fulfill moral
obligations. And they follow from some of the classical social contract
theory because they simultaneously seek to further self-interest and at
the same time are other-regarding, helping contractual parties as
moral agents show and act on the human and moral need for
compassion (as expounded by Rousseau). These new social contracts
share many (but certainly not all) of the characteristics of the older
ones, which will be considered in turn.
Social contracts organize members of society to allow them to
cooperate with each other and to better their prospects as a society in a
normative sense. The classical theorists (like Plato, Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau) centered their thoughts on natural persons who would enter
a social contract to better their individual lives, and ultimately, the lives
of individuals must remain central. But society now is composed of
members that include juridical persons, not just of the governmental
kind that the theorists conceived102 but the modern business enterprise.
These for-profit business corporations (themselves to a degree

101. This Article does not attempt to catalog the extensive contemporary writings
on the social contract, the post-Westphalian world order, or the multinational
enterprise. Each has its own extensive literature. Nevertheless, a particularly relevant
entry should be highlighted as it considers issues in a similar context and provides a
good entry into the literature. See DENNIS PATTERSON & ARI AFILALO, THE NEW GLOBAL
TRADING ORDER: THE EVOLVING STATE AND THE FUTURE OF TRADE (2008); see also
Horatia Muir Watt, Governing Networks: A Global Challenge for Private International Law,
22 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 352 (2015).
102. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau were all considering states of different sorts.
Plato, much earlier, at least considered a collective when he thought of a city, although
it may not have been an entity in the same sense as a sovereign or a government
considered by the early modern thinkers. See PLATO, supra note 29, bk. II, at 368e–
369a, at 50 (considering cities in addition to individuals).
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contractarian, but that is a subject for another day)103 were created and
allowed to flourish because of the economic growth they foster. The law
now treats them as persons not simply with traditional juridical
capacities like being able to hold assets and incur liabilities, and to sue
and be sued, but to speak and advocate as part of the body-politic.104
Aside from these legal and political rights, there can be little dispute that
business corporations act as influential members of society. The valence
of this action is certainly subject to debate (is it good or bad?), and the
granting of political rights like free speech is assuredly controversial, but
there is little doubt that corporations, factually, act as members of
society. The new social contracts in international supply chains
accommodate this reality. Corporations make these contracts.
The reason they make international supply contracts is to enable
cooperation and to create value. At least at first blush, this seems
obvious. The contracts establish a commercial relationship, often a
complicated one whose complexities in the context of supply chains
merit a whole field of study. But the point of the contract (or
contracts) is to allow persons to work together, to create economic
benefits for each other, and to improve their lives when without the
contracts they would be strangers living independently and without an
ability to render benefits to each other. The contracts enable and
effectuate that mutually beneficial relationship. That, at least, is the
motivation for the contracts; that is what the parties want. In Adam
Smith’s classic phrase summing up the idea of “bargain,” each party is
saying, “Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you
want.”105 The buyers are looking for manufacturing, to make money;
the suppliers are looking for a market, to make money; the workers are
looking for jobs, to make money—and perhaps to do more than make
money. (It is perhaps worth noting that manufacturing supply chains
that capture the value of labor seem perfectly if ironically orthogonal to

103. Contractual Governance: The Role of Private Ordering was the title for a panel held
by the Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 4, 2019). The published papers are
Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 106 CALIF. L.
REV. 373 (2018); Yaron Nili & Cathy Hwang, Shadow Governance, 108 CALIF. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020); Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Interpreting Organizational “Contracts”
and the Private Ordering of Public Company Governance, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 985 (2019).
104. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (holding
that non- and for-profit corporations, labor unions, and other associations enjoy the
rights granted by the Free Speech Clause); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
105. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 7 (5th ed. 1789).
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John Locke’s ideas about labor, value, and property.)106 This—the
money and the economic advantage—is the motivation, and in classical
(if outmoded) contract theory, this may be sufficient; it is certainly
necessary.107 In their inception and their aggregate effects, supply chain
contracts, like the classical social contract, are motivated by self-interest.
Moving from motivation and effects of the contracts to their
characteristics, note that the supply contract—or the web of contracts
that make up a supply chain—organize complex, multifaceted and
often multi-dimensional commercial relationships108 just as a social
contract organizes the polity of a society. This is no small task, either
with respect to political and constitutional organization or to the
establishment of complex supply chains that may span the globe and
that do not subsist in just one political or legal jurisdiction. But they
do take on that organizational task, and they are often successful, and
this remarkable fact resonates deeply in Hobbes. In his theory no one
can force members of society to cooperate when they are in a state of
nature; they need the social contract to constitute the common-wealth
and a Sovereign who can extract human cooperation if need be.109 In
the time of the classical theorists, the cooperation happened in the
nation-state that was constituted by the social contract. International
supply chains are largely divorced from nation states, or even nations
and national boundaries. The nation-state and its laws are not entirely
outmoded—the rule of law that they provide is necessary for the
contracts to have legal force, and their authoritative rulemaking power
may be necessary to effectuate the social goals of these supply
contracts110—but the supply contracts in their global and transnational
character provide a necessary supplement. The supply chain relationship
is voluntarily constituted, and it is successful (economically), motivated by
106. LOCKE, supra note 99, ¶¶ 27–28, at 128 (“[w]hatsoever then he removes out of
the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and
joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property,” i.e.,
“excludes the common right of other men”). I suggest that international supply chain
contracts are orthogonal to the labor theory because they intersect with that theory
but go in a different direction: the workers realize some value from their labor, but
much is captured by the employers or Western buyers.
107. ROUSSEAU, supra note 100, bk. II, ch. 4, at 157 (“[C]ommitments that bind us to the
body politic are obligatory only because they are mutual, and their nature is such that in
fulfilling them one cannot work for someone else without also working for oneself.”).
108. See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text.
109. HOBBES, supra note 98, at 101 (no one can “over-awe” man in a state of nature),
115 (justice and propriety start with the constitution of the common-wealth).
110. See LOCKE, supra note 4, at 17 passim.
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self-interest and human reason. Perhaps too it is remarkably Hobbesian,
in the pejorative sense—which is to say that it is marked by misery as well
as felicity, to borrow his words.111 That problem leads to the next section.
B. The Moral Nature of Social Contracts
There is more to the social contract (and at least arguably, all
contracts): they have a moral or normative component. Contracts
consist of promises; legally enforceable promises invoke duties both
legal and moral in nature.112 Supply contracts are sets of promises, and
promising is a moral act. This is true not only in the sense that
breaching a contract and thus breaking a promise is immoral (or at
least so it seemed before Holmes, and so it still often seems, as to
Fried).113 It is also true that making a promise and accepting a counterpromise is itself a moral act and reveals the morality of the promisors;
contracting is an “exercise of moral agency.”114
Yet there is an additional moral dimension for a contract that is
properly a social contract. It takes into account, and seeks to achieve,
a broad, far-reaching order that involves many people (members of
society), and it seeks to achieve social obligations, perhaps even social
justice, of which equality is a part. Indeed, one of the most striking
aspects of Hobbes’s exposition is the equality on which he insists for all
men.115 In his account, to be sure, this is hardly the happy equality of
childhood platitudes, and indeed this equality is part of the explanation
for war and misery.116 But equality is there, nevertheless, by nature.117
And where Hobbes is surprisingly founded on equality, Rousseau is
surprisingly rooted in compassion. Man is naturally compassionate,
Rousseau argues, and this compassion tempers the ferocity of his

111. HOBBES, supra note 98, at 99.
112. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 708 (2007) (arguing that promises are moral in nature, even in contracts, so
contract doctrine should accommodate the need to act morally).
113. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
(2d ed. 2015).
114. Aditi Bagchi, Voluntary Obligation and Contract, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
(forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3171189
(responding to HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS
(2017)).
115. HOBBES, supra note 98, at 99 (men by nature are equal).
116. Id. at 100–05.
117. Id. at 99.
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egocentrism.118 The motive for compassion is greater than a mere
feeling of pity, for compassion allows the “pleasure of doing good.”119
With this compassion, man can exercise his ability to choose how to
live after the fall from the state of nature and the ills borne of the
advent of property.120 This choice he can exercise through entering
into the social compact.121 Similarly, companies can fulfill their social
obligations, and can reach for a more just society, by attending to
fundamental moral matters in their contracts. If they are to have
political rights like free speech,122 they also ought to have duties rooted
in human compassion. Their supply contracts can thus be a new kind
of social contract. This seems well worth doing.
In reality the picture, notoriously, is not entirely rosy. Society
without question falls far short of the ideals. The Enlightenment
writers saw as much themselves, and Rousseau is perhaps best known
for the first sentence of The Social Contract: “Man is born free; and
everywhere he is in chains.”123 Certainly even the most ambitious and
idealistic supply contract will pale next to any utopian conception.
Whether in discussing the state or a supply chain, it can hardly be said
that we all place our power in the general will, nor do we all receive
“an indivisible part of the whole.”124
Beyond these obvious facts, the vision of the classical theorists
themselves was limited. As Charles W. Mills observes, “in keeping with
the Roman precedent, European humanism usually meant that only

118. ROUSSEAU, supra note 100, at 177 (English), 119–20 (French). The word pitié
is usually and perhaps best translated as pity but I will use compassion or compassionate,
which seems fair in that Rousseau uses the adjective compatissant to explain what he
means by pitié (reconnaître l’homme pour un être compatissant et sensible). Examination of
a related passage also suggests compassion: man has an “innate repugnance to seeing
a fellow-creature suffer,” and indeed, man will himself suffer if he cannot help a
mother and child who are under attack (as seen in the Fable of the Bees). Discourse
on the Origin of Inequality (the Second Discourse), pt. 1, at *XV (1754), in THE BASIC
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU 53 (Donald A. Cress ed. & trans. 1987),
and in DISCOURS SUR L’ORIGINE ET LES FONDEMENTS DE L’INEGALITE PARMI LES HOMMES 38
(Jean-Louis Lecercle ed. 1983) (in French).
119. ROUSSEAU, supra note 100, at 201, penultimate paragraph of the 2d discourse
(in English), in French at 43 (le plaisir de bien faire).
120. On the ills of property and the consequences of the fall, see ROUSSEAU, supra
note 100, at 202.
121. Id. at 111 (in English), which is On the Social Contract, bk. IV, ch. 2 (1762).
122. See supra note 104 (discussing Citizens United).
123. ROUSSEAU, supra note 100, at 35.
124. Id. at 24.
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Europeans were human.”125 From a feminist rather than a racial
standpoint, Carol Pateman argues that the social contract is preceded
by an earlier “pact” subjecting women to men,126 and the role of gender
seems particularly relevant here as so many workers in international
supply chains are women.127 This gender division internationally
accords with trends in the United States as well.128 Virginia Held, from
a different feminist perspective, observes that using contracts as a
paradigm for human relations is dreadfully constrained.129
“[C]ontractual theories,” she says, “hold out an impoverished view of
human aspiration.”130 Contractarian thought also fails to account for
the experience of many people, particularly women.131
These points can hardly be refuted, but they can perhaps be taken
into account. No doubt Professors Mills and Pateman and countless
others will consider it a paltry response, as they have more radical
solutions in mind, but any contractarian approach, such as the one
suggested in this Article, must count all humans as equals. Of course,
in practice they are not, and this fact founds the arguments for radical
change. But this Article takes a pragmatic approach and rests on a
belief that radical solutions (even assuming that they would be justified
and effective) are not within the realm of current possibility. Contracts
are what are used to institute and organize supply chains. Their
contractual nature resonates with the learning of the social contract
theorists. And those theories teach important moral as well as legal
and political lessons, although their moral nature is often overlooked.
In short, following Hobbes’s insistence on equality and expanding it to
everyone, and taking John Locke’s rejection of patriarchal society
seriously, translating it to our contemporary conceptions, will be
necessary for a morally justifiable use of social contract theory to
ground our views of supply contracts.
125. CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT 27 (1997).
126. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 2 (1988).
127. For the effect of the Bangladeshi disasters, see supra note 5 (many garment
workers are women). It appears that the vast majority of garment workers, at least, are
women. Sweatshops in Bangladesh, WAR ON WANT, https://waronwant.org/sweatshopsbangladesh (last visited June 1, 2019) (noting that 85% of garment workers are women).
128. DANIEL E. BENDER, SWEATED WORK, WEAK BODIES: ANTI-SWEATSHOP CAMPAIGNS
AND LANGUAGES OF LABOR (2004); JENNY MORRIS, WOMEN WORKERS AND THE SWEATED
TRADES: THE ORIGINS OF MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION (1986).
129. VIRGINIA HELD, FEMINIST MORALITY: TRANSFORMING CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND
POLITICS 193–95 (1993).
130. Id. at 194.
131. Id. at 194–95.
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I would suggest a different response to Professor Held’s argument.
She would re-center our paradigm from contract to something else,
and she explores the mother-child relation as one alternative.132 This
caring relationship fits well with Rousseau’s exploration of natural
human compassion. If we can take account of these three critics, the
contracts at issue—international supply chain contracts—must treat all
parties as equals and must allow for rights and duties of compassion.
These are moral rights and duties, not legal ones, but the supply chain
contracts can allow the parties to meet their moral duties and to make
them legal.133 In this sense the supply chain contracts are social
contracts, in a sense that is partly the same and partly different from
the classical ideas. But they are designed to achieve justice, to enable
cooperation, to organize a large, complex, and far-flung cooperative
relationship, and to be mutually beneficial. And they seek to reach out
in societal directions, not to constrain themselves to ordinary two- or
three-party contractual relations.
These new social contracts, then, share some aims of the social
contract—organizational and moral goals across a diffuse polity—but
they are new in some ways, more modest in some ways, and more
ambitious in others.
The new social contracts are made by
multinational enterprises, where the classical social contract was made
by individuals (and perhaps the political entity they thus formed, like
the nation-state or the sovereign). In that way, these supply chain
contracts are new social contracts. In that they do not seek to form an
entire political system, they are more modest, of course. At the same
time, they are more ambitious in that they stretch across borders and
beyond states, fitting a world more global than could have been
conceived in early modern times. These contracts are also more
modest in that they are more time-constrained; they do not seek to be
permanent or even (typically) indefinite. But they are iterative: a
contract for one set of shirts can lead to a contract for another set, and
another, and so on. As the contractual process repeats, the parties
have the opportunity to learn and grow, to adjust their relationship,
and to build a shared vision and purpose.134 In an ordinary contract,
this learning is geared to a commercial purpose. In the kinds of
contracts envisioned here—these new social contracts—that learning

132. Id. at 195.
133. Cf. Shiffrin, supra note 112, at 709 (advocating for contracting principles that
encourage morality).
134. See generally MACNEIL, supra note 3.
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and building can move the parties not only to greater economic
efficiency but also toward shared moral commitments, even though
they come from vastly disparate societies.
C. The Special Moral Duties that Attend Supply Chain Relationships
Having argued that contracts have essential moral aspects and that
social contracts even more so, the moral obligations particular to
supply chain contracts deserve special consideration. There is a
problem here: ordinarily contracts are not conceived as being entered
to achieve broad social effects, much less social justice,135 and indeed
that is part of the argument for why supply chain contracts with human
rights protections are properly considered social contracts. But what of
the relationship between Western Company and the people who work
in its supply chain, when they are separated by thousands of miles and
several (if not many) legal links, separating and insulating Western
Company? Relationship, causation, and proximity are all central to
both legal analysis and moral reasoning.
Whatever moral responsibility Western Company has toward
geographically and legally distant workers might seem weak. To be
sure, Western Company receives a benefit from the workers, and this
benefit might found a claim in justice. Following Aristotle’s reasoning,
that claim becomes even stronger if the workers are harmed while
conveying that benefit.136 These ideas are behind some of the litigation
around the disasters in Bangladesh,137 and these kinds of ideas also
pervade the literature that seeks to hold Western buyers responsible
for injuries to workers in supply chains.138 That a two-party contract
can have innumerable effects on many who are not party to the

135. The same has traditionally been true for business corporations, as discussed
briefly infra note 141.
136. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V, 1130a14-1133b28 (David Ross
trans., 1980). See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U.
TORONTO L.J. 349 (2002).
137. E.g., Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. N15C-07-174MMJ, 2016 WL 2616375,
at *9 n.68 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016).
138. See, e.g., David Kinley & Jahan Navidi, The Long Arm of Human Rights Risk: Supply
Chain Management and Legal Responsibility, 3 BUS. & HUM. RTS. REV. 10 (2013); Justine
Nolan, Business and Human Rights: The Challenge of Putting Principles into Practice and
Regulating Global Supply Chains, 42 ALT. L.J. 42 (2017); Ryan J. Turner, Commentary,
Transnational Supply Chain Regulation: Extraterritorial Regulation as Corporate Law’s New
Frontier, 17 MELB. J. INT’L L. 188 (2016).
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contract is certainly a familiar notion,139 and there is no doubt about
the far-reaching effects of supply contracts in international supply
chains.140 Whatever merit these arguments may hold, I explore a
different moral and legal calculus based on considerations of whether
there should be a duty to rescue.
To begin, observe that Western Company (assuming that
corporations have moral as well as legal duties)141 probably has a
139. See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 211 (2015)
(examining how third parties—such as downstream buyers, suppliers, and
consumers—are affected by contract).
140. See, e.g., Alice Evans, Hope for Reform: Strengthening Corporate Accountability in
Global Supply Chains, RESEARCHGATE (Mar. 2019), https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/326293484_Hope_for_Reform_Strengthening_Corporate_Accountabilit
y_in_Global_Supply_Chains.
141. Finding a moral duty in a typical business corporation, particularly one
organized under Delaware law, requires some acknowledgment of a possible conflict
between a moral duty and the traditional duty of the board to maximize wealth for
shareholders. Whether the board owes only duties of wealth maximization to
shareholders or instead owes broader duties to countless and potentially diffuse other
stakeholders (e.g., with respect to environmental sustainability) is a large and
controverted topic. There is considerable current recognition of potential corporate
duties aside from shareholder wealth maximization. The Supreme Court recognized
as much in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 711–12 (2014), which
found that “modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue
profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so.” This opinion accords
with some current scholarly conceptions. See, e.g., Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout,
Contested Visions: The Value of Systems Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579,
615 (2018) (“[T]he systems approach does not focus on profits alone, and does not
direct managers to try to maximize them.”); Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating Social Activism,
98 B.U. L. REV. 1535, 1593 (2018) (“Contemporary corporate social activism . . . shifts
businesses from their traditional singular, amoral purpose of profit maximization to a
new multivariate aim that takes into greater consideration social impact and social
value on an equivalent or nearly equivalent basis as profit maximization.”). Views are
divided, however. Many scholars continue to adhere to shareholder primacy. See
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 563 (2003) (“[M]ost corporate law scholars embrace some
variant of shareholder primacy.”). And crucially, Delaware adheres to shareholder
primacy and profit maximization. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16
A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). For the classic statement of the traditional view, see Dodge
v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”). Nevertheless,
fulfilment of moral duties may in fact be profit-maximizing corporate strategies, see
Lin, supra, at 1595, in which case corporations would have further reason to pursue
their moral goals. Stephen Bainbridge, Case Law on the Fiduciary Duty of Directors to
Maximize the Wealth of Corporate Shareholders, STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE’S J.L., RELIGION, POL.,
& CULTURE (May 5, 2012), https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbri
dgecom/2012/05/case-law-on-the-fiduciary-duty-of-directors-to-maximize-the-wealth-
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relatively weak moral duty to, say, children who are dying of starvation
and disease in a part of the world where it has no operations, no
personnel, no contracts (directly or indirectly), and in short, no
connection, except insofar as Western Company is a citizen of the world.
To be sure, some moral duty may be present. Individuals may feel
morally obligated to send money to responsible aid agencies to work
toward fulfilling such a duty. But those who choose not to do so are not
castigated as evil, or even morally irresponsible. Perhaps there is some
moral duty to rescue those starving children, but in practice it seems
weak. Few feel the need to sell their cars and forego their other comforts
to raise money to send to famine-ridden parts of the world.
On the legal side, to say that there is no duty to rescue is a fair
statement of the general rule, but the rule is subject to a variety of
exceptions. Helpfully, the rescue scenarios are factually, morally,
legally, and socially similar to supply chain relationships. In this
context, the common law has (so far) largely refused legal cognizance
for duties that the law considers (at most) moral and social, and in a
number of fact-situations, there may be no generally accepted moral
or social duty at all. But a variety of facts can affect the analysis and
may change the outcome: whether the magnitude of harm is great;
whether the rescue is difficult and whether it is likely to succeed;
whether the potential rescuer caused the problem; whether the parties
have a relationship with each other; whether the victim is reasonably
relying on the rescuer; and finally, the degree of inconvenience or
danger to the rescuer.142 Each of these factors is worth consideration,
and as will become apparent, some of them probably need to be viewed
through a normative lens to be morally intelligible. The “just and
reasonable” test will help give moral grounding where necessary.
1.

The magnitude of harm to the victim
This factor is the easiest in the paradigm assumed, for the magnitude
of potential harm is infinite in moral terms—loss of life, grievous
injury, all multiplied by hundreds or thousands—and quantifiable but
of-corporate-shareholders.html. This conclusion seems particularly plausible in the
case of supply chains for companies in consumer-facing industries, where companies
who ignore the human rights of the workers in their supply chains may suffer serious
punishment at the hands of their consumer buyers, with considerable damage to their
brand value. The same may be true even outside consumer markets. But extended
exploration of these questions is beyond the scope of this Article.
142. See McCall Smith, supra note 1, at 87. I follow McCall Smith’s analysis
throughout this section of the Article.
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still large in economic terms. The economics are calculable and
amenable to application of the Hand formula from United States v.
More specifics would require empirical
Carroll Towing Co.143
quantification, but in the paradigm it is safe to say that frequently the
burden of preventing the harm is significantly less than the magnitude of
harm multiplied by its probability. In other words, frequently this factor
will militate toward imposing a duty to improve working conditions. This
factor is only one of many, though, and it may be defeated by the
complications that arise in the analysis of the other factors.
2.

The difficulty of rescue and its likelihood of success
This factor is terrifically complex, although the complexity can be
conveyed briefly. Bookend hypotheticals clarify the situation. A
company that says, “There is nothing we can do to help,” does not
make a credible statement. A company that commits to eradicating
labor problems in its supply chain takes on what is at least a daunting,
multigenerational task, if not an impossible one. A company that
commits to a middle position—improving working conditions in its
supply chain and eliminating the most egregious problems—takes on
a task that seems possible, reasonable, and perhaps necessary,
although change may be incremental. To be sure, for many the middle
ground is insufficient, and such companies in their eyes deserve to be
pilloried for their lack of commitment to a full-scale ideal. But to many
a commitment to the ideal seems impractical if not impossible.
These hypotheticals suggest that there is a reasonable likelihood that
a company could succeed in improving working conditions to a
meaningful degree some of the time. The task appears difficult,
complex, and unlikely to succeed all of the time. The available
evidence suggests, in short, that some progress is possible but that it
falls far short unless it is bolstered by public efforts.144

143. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). The usual formula is B < PL, meaning that if the
burden of preventing the harm (B) is less than the probability of harm (P) multiplied
by the magnitude of the harm (or liability) (L) then the defendant has a duty of care
to the plaintiff. Id. at 173; see also The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 739–40 (2d Cir. 1932)
(holding the cargo barge and tugboat owners were both liable to the cargo owner
because the boats were unseaworthy: they leaked, the pumps were not inspected, and
there were no radios to receive weather reports).
144. LOCKE, supra note 4, at 19–20 passim.
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3.

Causation
Obviously, if a potential rescuer put the victim in the predicament,
the rescuer’s obligation to rescue becomes stronger. But if the putative
rescuer can say, “Your damage has got nothing to do with me. I did
not cause it,” the courts will be quite reluctant to impose liability.145
Liability would challenge common notions even on the traditional
rescue example of the stranger walking by the person drowning.
Arguably the putative rescuer’s inaction—his failure to rescue—causes
the damage, and theoretically this is factually true. To apply the “but
for” test: but for the failure to rescue, the victim would not have
drowned. Yet to say that the passerby caused the victim to drown does
serious damage to the language. Put more concretely: If I say Cooper
caused Alex to drown, it sounds like Cooper threw Alex in the water,
not that Cooper failed to rescue him (although that understanding is
still possible). In this example, then, it seems that causation is absent,
but the position is not entirely clear.
The position in the context of international supply chains differs
from the example of drowning and is in some ways clearer, although
the conclusion is hardly crystalline. Western Company did not put the
workers in a position of great desperation for a job. That was a matter
of circumstantial luck (another instance of moral luck),146 and Western
Company has no greater moral duty than anyone else in the world to
improve the workers’ initial situation. By providing employment that
improves the workers’ lives, collectively and in the aggregate at least,
Western Company has made matters better, not worse. Let us suppose
that Western Company does not provide a “living wage,” although
wages in working (indirectly) for Western Company are higher than
otherwise would be available. It would seem ambitious to argue that
Western Company must provide a living wage, although the argument
is appealing and is frequently made. It is not clear why it is wrong to
take an incremental step in the right direction, even if it does not reach
the goal that might be hoped for, given the starting position that
Western Company owes no particular duty to these workers (before
they started working, at least indirectly, for Western Company) in the
first place. Probably the strongest argument for a duty to provide a
living wage is the same as the one that applies in any context: if
Western Company is making profits and paying some people wages
well above a living wage, then there are moral reasons to require the
145. McCall Smith, supra note 1, at 88 (quoting a hypothetical speaker).
146. See supra notes 56–57 (discussing moral luck).
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pie to be split differently, to equalize pay, and to assure that everyone
can at least subsist above the poverty level. This argument is beyond
the scope of the current inquiry. If it holds outside the context of
international supply chains, it presumably should hold within that
context. But such a showing has not been widely accepted.
On the other hand, if the (indirect) operations of Western Company
put workers in harm’s way—depriving them of their liberty, their
health, or their lives—the causal connection is different. No longer
can Western Company say, “Your damage has got nothing to do with
me. I did not cause it.”147 The case is strongest with respect to forced
labor: the need to satisfy the production requirements caused
traffickers to force the victim to work. Less obvious is the worker who
is injured or killed in the factory over which Western Company has no
direct control (a point that we will return to).148 If the factory catches
fire or collapses because of poor management by those with direct
control, arguably Western Company did not “cause” the damage, but it
is debatable. In any case Western Company cannot say, “Your damage
has got nothing to do with me.” The damage has at least something to
do with Western Company. This would suggest a moderate causal
connection: not the strongest case, but not the weakest either.
The causal prong, then, suggests that Western Company owes a moral
duty to prevent forced labor and to avoid endangering workers. Still, each
of these statements has been parenthetically qualified with the indirect
nature of the relationship between Western Company and international
workers. Legally, the intermediated nature of the relationship has (so far)
largely insulated the companies from monetary liability.149 But perhaps
the most salient question is whether the supply chain itself provides a
sufficient relationship to ground the moral duty even in the absence of
the strongest causal connection: while it is useful to separate cause and
relationship, a link should also be recognized. Where there is a
sufficiently close and strong relationship, we may say that one person has
caused harm to another even though the first has only failed to act. A
parent who fails to provide food and shelter to a young child may well be
said to have caused the child’s death. But it is unlikely that many would
say I have caused the death of a child with whom I have no relationship
and who lives on another continent. The relationship between Western
Company and its workers is considered in the next section.
147. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
148. See infra Section II.C.4.
149. See Lampley, supra note 55.
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4.

The relationship between Western companies and workers in the developing world
“‘Proximity’ may not sound like a term which carries a great deal of
moral baggage,”150 but it does, and every lawyer who has struggled
through the study of proximate cause knows the central place of
proximity in legal reasoning. To tweak the scenario that concluded the
previous section: I may owe a greater duty to someone in immediate
need of my assistance if he is on my doorstep than I owe to a child
starving on another continent. For example, if to save someone’s life I
need to do something that would result in the complete and immediate
uninsured loss of my car, I would do so in an instant and would be
blameworthy if I do not do so. But I do not need to sell my car to donate
the proceeds to save ten starving children on another continent.
This, at least, is our intuition and experience (for most of us—with
occasional saintly exceptions). Whether this can withstand moral and
philosophical scrutiny, however, is controversial. Peter Singer, for
instance, argues that I ought to take care of those ten starving children
on another continent if I can; I ought to sell my car, particularly since
I am perfectly capable of taking public transportation or riding my
bicycle.151 If we are to take human equality seriously, as Hobbes insists
and as was happily conceded above,152 it would seem, at least at first,
that Singer must be right.153
Such a conclusion offends our common experience, however, and
other philosophers would justify our intuition. We all may recognize
some duty to distant victims of famine, but that duty may be overshadowed
by more immediate needs. In deciding how to act, we will need to
distinguish between what is required by duty and what goes beyond what
duty requires (i.e., what is supererogatory).154 In assessing moral duties,
we have to remember that humans have limited capacity, and efforts to
aid will be limited in scope. In deciding what efforts are required,
efficiency ought to be considered, and while the world is shrinking
through technological innovation, our resources can be deployed more

150. McCall Smith, supra note 1, at 86.
151. See Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229, 231,
239 (1972) (arguing that people should sacrifice “anything of comparable moral
importance” if necessary).
152. HOBBES, supra note 98, at 99; see also supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text
(on equality).
153. Singer, supra note 151, at 232, 239 (basing his argument on equality).
154. See F.M. Kamm, The New Problem of Distance in Morality, in INTRICATE ETHICS:
RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND PERMISSIBLE HARM 12, 14 (2007); F.M. Kamm, Does
Distance Matter Morally to the Duty to Rescue?, 19 LAW & PHIL. 655 (2000).
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efficiently when the need is proximate. It is not a mistake to invest most
heavily in those near us,155 especially when the realities of human
psychology—our likely responses and empathy—are considered.156
These ideas reinforce the duties of Western buyers to workers in
their supply chains. Even if Professor Singer’s far-reaching notions of
moral duty are rejected, the supply chain creates a connection157 and
brings Western Company into much closer proximity to workers in the
supply chain. Supply chains are in fact about the efficient deployment
of resources; that very efficiency can be brought to bear to protect
human rights as it is harnessed to manufacture goods. However it is
considered, from the standpoint of moral proximity there is enough
connection between Western Company and supply chain workers to
found a moral duty to provide safe and healthy working conditions for
free women and men.
The irony is that the law does everything it can to push the parties
apart and to break the link of proximity. As proximity founds a moral
duty, it can bring a legal one, and Western Company is safest if it has
as little to do as possible with the operations in its supply chain. Legal
considerations will repel Western Company from involvement with
what is happening in its factories, as recent litigation underscores; the
more control Western Company exerts, and the more steps it takes to
improve working conditions in supply chain factories, the greater its
legal exposure.158 This seems counterproductive and raises questions
about the legal liability regime.159 Arguably human rights duties, given
this policy consideration (as opposed to the moral consideration)
should be taken on voluntarily and should be in the nature of
contractual rather than delictual obligation. In other words, the moral
duty should not be imposed as a legal duty, but the law should allow it
155. See Arnold Burms, Proximity and Particularism, 3 ETHICAL PERSP. 157 (1996).
156. See Per Nortvedt & Marita Nordhaug, The Principle and Problem of Proximity in
Ethics, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 156 (2008).
157. One way to establish a relationship, of course, is by voluntarily undertaking
one. See R v. Stone & Dobinson [1977], 1 QB 354 (Eng.); McCall Smith, supra note 1,
at 63–64 (citing R v. Instan [1893], 1 QB 450 (Eng.)).
158. See Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. N15C-07-174MMJ, 2016 WL 2616375,
at *9 n.68 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016) (noting that “as long as the general contractor
ignores workplace safety, the general contractor is shielded from liability to the
employees of independent contractors”).
159. See id. Although the context is entirely different, the problem is discussed
thoroughly in NICK GILL, NOTHING PERSONAL? GEOGRAPHIES OF GOVERNING AND
ACTIVISM IN THE BRITISH ASYLUM SYSTEM 23 (2016) (“[E]xplor[ing] the issue of moral
distance as it relates to administering . . . bureaucracy.”).
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to be assumed when there is an express manifestation of assent or other
evidence of the willing and voluntary assumption of a legal duty.160
Indeed, assumption of such duties perhaps should even be promoted by
rules like Good Samaritan statutes, encouraging companies to take
active measures to improve conditions rather than impelling companies
to stay as far away as possible.161 In some jurisdictions such a duty might
be undertaken even through promises that might not be considered
contractual under U.S. law.162 This strategy might achieve the right
policy result and probably promotes (although is not the same as) the
correct moral result. It also promotes the employment of poor workers
in the developing world, which is also a good result as a matter of policy
and morality.163 That idea will be discussed shortly.
5.

Reliance
It is certainly possible to conceive of a victim as relying on the
potential rescuer.164 In one sense, the drowning man is relying on the
stranger walking by to throw him the life preserver that has been
helpfully placed by the authorities at the waterside. But in another
sense, particularly for those used to thinking in contractual terms, the
idea of reliance suggests that the person relying made a decision in
reliance on another person, and that in this way reliance does not
make sense as a justification for finding a duty to rescue. It is true that
160. Allowing Western Company to assume the duty would comport with Shiffrin,
supra note 112, at 719, 736, 742. The “willing and voluntary” nature of the undertaking
should be emphasized, and clear and convincing evidence might be required: if the
courts are too quick to imply an undertaking, the judiciary will again push Western
buyers away from their supply chains.
161. See infra Section II.C.6.
162. See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW art. 2:107 (2005); PRINCIPLES,
DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF
REFERENCE, bk. II, arts. 1:103(2), 4:301–4:303 (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2010);
Muriel Fabre-Magnan, Les Fausses Promesses des Entreprises: RSE et Droit Commun des
Contrats, in ETUDES EN L’HONNEUR DE PHILIPPE NEAU-LEDUC: LE JURISTE DANS LA CITE 451,
454 (2018). Similar ideas have been litigated in the United States. See Order Denying
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Nat’l Consumers League v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No.
2015 CA 007731 B, 2016 WL 4080541, at *11 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 22, 2016) (holding
that the complaint stated a claim based on defendants’ allegedly misleading statements
with respect to human rights audits). Other claims, however, were dismissed on
defendants’ motion, see id., and the case was later dismissed entirely, with prejudice,
based on the parties’ joint stipulation. See Order Granting Consent Joint Motion for
Judgment, id. (D.C. Super. Ct. July 14, 2017).
163. Ian Ayres, Monetize Labor Practices, in FUNG ET AL., supra note 27, at 80 (“[I]f the
terms are fair, contracting with the poor can be a good thing.”).
164. McCall Smith, supra note 1, at 87.
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the victim who drowned depended on the putative rescuer, but this
seems a more accurate statement than to say that he relied on the
rescuer, and more natural linguistically.
A reliance argument also goes too far in that reliance would always
be present if dependence and reliance are the same. Is it just and
reasonable to rely on someone? Probably so, if someone has promised
or committed to help. In this way, promises can matter, even if they
are not contractual promises.165 In that case someone may well rely;
perhaps we think so because that reliance is now foreseeable and thus
reasonable and justifiable.166 Someone may make a decision in
reliance on the promise. But someone who needs rescue, and who
thus depends on the rescuer, is in a different position, and the
potential rescuer is too, if the rescuer has simply happened onto the
scene afterwards. The rescuer did not do anything that results in the
claimed reliance, so to say there is any reliance at all seems strange. It
is true of course that the law may impose liability on one person when
another person depends on him. Dependence by itself, however,
cannot be enough. Then we would all be liable to everyone in the
world who needs our help.
In the context of supply chains, there may be no reliance, then,
especially in the legal and contractual sense. But there might be in
some circumstances, and if Western Company were to make
commitments to the workers—as it should—then they might rely, and
Western Company should probably be liable. On the other hand,
Western Company may prefer to attempt ameliorative measures
without committing to do so; it may prefer to limit its exposure. In that
case, if the workers rely on the bona fide efforts of Western Company,
should their reliance be legally cognizable? Traditionally the law
would in fact recognize such claims in that a person would have no
duty to rescue, but if he undertook a rescue, he owed a duty of
reasonable care and could be liable for, say, negligent failure to

165. Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Nat’l Consumers League, 2016 WL
4080541, at 11 (qualifying language such as “expect,” “goal,” and “ask” shows an
aspiration rather than a promise or commitment).
166. This thinking grounds liability for promissory estoppel, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981), as well as similar doctrines in other
legal systems. See generally David V. Snyder, Hunting Promissory Estoppel, in MIXED
JURISDICTIONS COMPARED: PRIVATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND SCOTLAND 281 (Vernon
Valentine Palmer & Elspeth Christie Reid eds., 2009).

1924

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1869

complete the rescue.167 That doctrine, however, gives a serious
disincentive to rescue and is subject to considerable statutory reversal.
Those matters are considered in the next section.
6.

The oddest inconvenience
If I can rescue a stranger at no danger or inconvenience to myself, it
is hard to imagine why I would not do it, and for that reason, it is hard
to imagine that my society would not consider it just and reasonable
that I rescue the victim. Should I ignore the victim, I would probably
seem callous to the point of immorality to my friends and compatriots.
Yet when this, the seemingly most straightforward factor is considered
in the supply chain context, the fact-situation falls apart.
At first it seems that the inconvenience of taking responsibility for
workers in the supply chain is really a matter only of finance and
marketing. Arguably the poor working conditions and other ills are
linked to, if not entirely caused by, the drive for profits and the
imperative to bring new goods to market speedily.168 Dismissing such
matters is easy—they are mere business considerations that pale when
put next to human health, safety, and liberty. But these considerations
are the force behind the very existence of any relationship at all
between the Western buyers and the workers in the developing world.
Were it not for the economic attraction of the labor markets and
production facilities in the developing world, Western buyers would
not have operations or contracts there. Only if the economic forces
draw the Western buyers do those buyers have any link with those
particular workers (assuming that the common link of humanity is too
diffuse to ground a strong enough moral duty for anyone other than
saints, as discussed above).
In that light, pale economic inconvenience turns existential. If
taking steps to ameliorate working conditions—i.e., the rescue—erases
the profitability and speed of production that engendered the
relationship, the relationship disappears. The danger or inconvenience
of rescue, then, is a fundamental factor militating against finding a
duty. And while danger is the wrong word where the question is one
167. 2A STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 9:23 (1983)
(“Generally, the law did not impose liability upon those who stand idly by and fail to
rescue a stranger . . . . Under modern law, a duty to use reasonable care to assist
another in danger has been imposed. However, Good Samaritan statutes may modify
this duty or provide for nonliability of rescuers.”). Good Samaritan laws are discussed
in the next section. See infra Section II.C.6.
168. E.g., LOCKE, supra note 4, ch. 6.
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of economic duties or hardships rather than jumping into a roiling
river, the word is appropriate in that it indicates that whatever benefits,
economic or otherwise, accrue to the workers because of the supply
chain could vanish. Given that in some cases those benefits are crucial
to the workers’ livelihood (in the literal sense), an imposed duty to
rescue is questionable. Western companies would need to assume any
such duties voluntarily.
True, once the relationship is started perhaps the moral duties
attach and cannot be freely escaped. This conception fits well into the
doctrine on the duty to rescue; traditional analysis holds that while
there is no duty to rescue, once a rescue is undertaken it must be
performed with reasonable care.169 But this common law thinking has
proved faulty as a matter of policy and has been reversed over time as
a matter of doctrine by Good Samaritan statutes. Every jurisdiction in
the United States has adopted a Good Samaritan statute of one kind
or another; typically they protect the rescuer from liability.170
Assuming moderately rational decision making by Western
companies, then, even without assuming perfectly efficient markets,
imposition of duties and liability could dry up future markets if the
economic incentive were to disappear. Indeed, at least in the
environmental context, the most success may come from easing rather
than increasing liability, provided the companies are transparent and
disclose their environmental problems.171 For this reason, rather than
imposing liability for failure to meet mandated standards, an approach
similar to these environmental contexts—essentially Good Samaritan
statutes for supply chains—may be better.172

169. See AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 9:23.
170. See Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Construction and Application of “Good
Samaritan” Statutes, 68 A.L.R. 4th 294 (1989) (“Good Samaritan statutes are generally
designed to protect individuals from civil liability for any negligent acts or omissions
committed while voluntarily providing emergency care.”). See generally Eric A. Brandt,
Good Samaritan Laws—The Legal Placebo: A Current Analysis, 17 AKRON L. REV. 303, 303
(1984). A current sampling includes GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29 (West 2015); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-1 (West 1987); OKLA. STAT.
TIT. 76, § 5 (West 1979); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.151 (West 2013); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 895.48 (West 2017).
171. See Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, The Regulation Dilemma: Cooperation and
Conflict in Environmental Governance, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 152, 152 (2004); see also LOCKE,
supra note 4, at 24 (collecting authorities).
172. A careful consideration of this idea is beyond the scope of the present Article,
but for the reasons stated in the text and the preceding footnote, this approach
appears to be among the most promising.
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This logic would seem to be borne out by more granular analysis based
on a combination of the costs of improving working conditions and the
strength of corporate conscience. Let us assume two possibilities.
(1) Improving working conditions erases economic incentives to
make goods abroad.
(2) Improving working conditions reduces but does not eliminate
economic incentives to make goods abroad, but improving
conditions and thus reducing incentives in Developing Country A
provides an incentive to shift production to Developing Country B.

Let us further assume that corporate conscience is strong enough to
justify incurring some cost. In other words, the Western Company
would not buy cotton picked by child slaves even if it were the least
expensive option and there were no legal obstacles. Let us further
assume that there are no relevant legal obstacles.173 In the first
scenario, goods will not be made abroad over the long run. The
experience of moving production to non-unionized factories in the
American South, only to see the work migrate away from the South and
to other countries174 suggests that this possibility is more than
theoretical. In either case, the benefits of the economic relationship
disappear in the long run. The only way to avoid this result is to impose
legal regulation worldwide, to impose legal regulation widely enough
that the only unregulated countries are plagued by conditions that are
173. See supra note 141.
174. There are a tremendous number of articles and papers on this subject. Some
are rigorous. E.g., Thomas J. Holmes, The Effect of State Policies on the Location of
Manufacturing: Evidence from State Borders, 106 J. POL. ECON. 667 (1998); Edward L.
Glaeser & Kristina Tobio, The Rise of the Sunbelt (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 13071, 2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/w13071 (attributing data on
Southern housing supply and prices to the rise in Sunbelt jobs). Some are scholarly
but are not quantitative. Consider the section on “Sweatshop Migrations” in
SWEATSHOP USA, supra note 67, including Greenwald, supra note 67, at 77; Xiaolan
Bao, Sweatshops in Sunset Park: A Variation of the Late-Twentieth-Century Chinese Garment
Shops in New York City, id. at 117; Edna Bonacich et al., Offshore Production, id. at 141;
Immanuel Ness, Globalization and Worker Organization in New York City’s Garment Industry,
id. at 169; Kenneth C. Wolensky, “An Industry on Wheels”: The Migration of Pennsylvania’s
Garment Factories, id. at 91. Others are recent but more journalistic. E.g., Justin Fox,
Manufacturing Moved South, Then Moved Out, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 7, 2015, 3:53 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-10-07/manufacturing-moved-south
-then-it-moved-to-china (tracking the movement of manufacturing jobs from the
Rustbelt to the Sunbelt then to China); Howard Schneider, U.S. South, Not Just Mexico,
Stands in Way of Rust Belt Jobs Revival, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2017, 1:15 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-south-insight/u-s-south-not-just-mexic
o-stands-in-way-of-rust-belt-jobs-revival-idUSKBN1790HO (attributing the decline in
rust belt jobs to cheaper labor and more land availability in the South).

2019]

THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACTS IN SUPPLY CHAINS

1927

so bad that either economic constraints (e.g., incompetent workers or
unreliable production facilities) or corporate conscience would
prevent shifting production to those countries. In the paradigm
assumed for this Article, however, such widespread regulation is
impossible in the foreseeable future. So, the bottom line is that the
inconvenience or danger of rescue might prevent the imposition of a
duty to rescue, i.e., a duty to improve working conditions. Still, such
duties should be voluntarily assumed, perhaps with some incentives
from Good Samaritan-like immunity.
III. IMPLICATIONS
A. Preservation of the Non-Legal Channel of Relationships
The previous section argued that there is a moral duty to protect the
human rights of workers in international supply chains, although that
duty may be stronger or weaker depending on a variety of factors.
Despite this moral duty, the case for public legal protection of workers
in international supply chains is surprisingly ambivalent. In an ideal
world, there is no question that there would be such protection. But
in an ideal world it would not be necessary, and this Article takes a
pragmatic approach that includes current political, geographical,
economic, and commercial realities.
The obvious argument is to impose as much in the way of human rights
protections as possible. This would seem strong. The moral reasons for
it are intuitive, and a careful consideration, like that attempted above,
corroborates the intuition. Further, the leading empirical work by Provost
Locke suggests that significant progress is possible only if private efforts
and public involvement can come together.175 This carefully researched
finding itself corroborates another intuition: that public and private
efforts will be more successful together than either could be separately.
All of this would suggest that public regulation would be beneficial as a
matter of policy, as well as a matter of morals.
I am not in the end sure, however. Although the UN Guiding
Principles176 managed to achieve the goals of garnering corporate
commitments and establishing a broad framework, the Principles

175. LOCKE, supra note 4, at 17 passim. This conclusion is perhaps clearest with
respect to the positive relationship between a country’s laws and regulations, on the
one hand, and Nike M-Audit scores for its suppliers, based on extensive and rigorous
data collection and statistical analysis, on the other. See id. at 58.
176. See supra note 9.
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themselves are general and vague. An outside observer, bewildered by
the plethora of standards from the NGO side alone, would note a lack
of consensus, and when the corporate side is added, it appears that no
agreement can be reached with respect to what public regulation
would provide. The sort of minimal duties enacted in some places
already (due diligence, or disclosure)177 may do little harm, but they
may also do little good,178 and they are not costless. With a lack of
consensus, public regulation may well wind up being expensive and
ineffective. In addition, the disagreement may lead to a law that is
hopelessly compromised, making it even more expensive and
ineffective than a law that is merely bromidic or disclosure-oriented.
In other words, efforts at public regulation may not be productive, and
they could distract from private efforts that might establish standards
or norms that, after experience with implementation, could eventually
be turned into public regulation.
The concern that ambitious regulation could also hurt the economies
of developing countries, deprive workers of desperately needed jobs,
and result in a de facto protectionist regime is another reason militating
against adoption of unduly ambitious public regulation.179 Such
arguments must be approached with caution, even skepticism: taken to
their extreme, they would suggest that no regulation at all is ever a good
idea. But these arguments do require a robust and forthright
response—either that those costs are worth bearing, which would
require a careful empirical examination, or that the arguments
themselves are flawed and that there are no such costs, at least not of
significance. But my research has not disclosed such a robust response.
To be sure, the literature disparages the arguments and casts them in
pejorative terms,180 but what I have not found is an answer to them.
A final concern is that publicly imposed liability for human rights
problems in supply chains could, in fact, be counterproductive. This
is what Judge Johnston decried in Rahaman.181 If a corporation like

177. See supra note 11.
178. See Chilton & Sarfaty, supra note 26, at 20–25, 45 (arguing supply chain
disclosures are unlikely to help decrease human rights abuses).
179. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text (on protectionism).
180. Consider HAPKE, supra note 36, at 132–35.
181. Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. N15C-07-174MMJ, 2016 WL 2616375, at *9
n.68 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016). In short, tort doctrine encourages buyers to
distance themselves from the supply chain and to “ignore[ ] workplace safety” as a
means to “escape liability”; “the better rule would be to encourage general contractors
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Western Company exposes itself to liability by undertaking to improve
working conditions in its supply chain, it will have every reason to
divorce itself from such matters, or to move its operations somewhere
safer. The first alternative is certainly not desirable; the second is at
best debatable. True, if public regulation were to require the company
to improve working conditions, then the company would have to do so
and (we will assume) could not escape. But if nothing else, that does
not seem a likely possibility at present, and the paradigm that applies
in this Article assumes as much.
None of this is a great surprise, although it is not the answer that
many would like to hear. Differing countries, cultures, expectations,
stages of development—all can be expected to make harmonized
standards difficult. And supply chain problems have been intractable
for decades. But there is a more fundamental aspect, based on the
law’s own limits. The classical theorists of obligations recognized
centuries ago the practical problems of turning all moral obligations
into legal ones. The common law for these reasons has long held
moral obligations to have limited legal effects.182 Typically such
obligations are binding in the forum of the conscience but not in a
legal forum.183 In this the common law is following (or parallels)
thinking in the civil law.184 In short, we are on familiar ground when
contract law separates legal obligation from moral duty and provides
the latter with limited legal effects. And this may be a good result,
given differing views on moral commitments. The moral obligations
of the common law and the natural obligations of the civil law (so
called because they are based on natural law)185 are infamously difficult
to define, so it is typical for them to be left to non-legal enforcement.
In the eyes of the law, they can be only “imperfect” obligations, and
judicial efforts to incorporate them into law (such as the efforts of Lord

to take all reasonable measures to ensure the safety of all workers.” Id.; see supra notes
92–93 and accompanying text.
182. E.g., Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 86 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
183. Mills, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) at 209 (in foro conscientiæ).
184. See 2 ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS OR
CONTRACTS 2 n.(a) (William D. Evans trans., 1806) (le for de la conscience).
185. In civil law theory and history, natural obligations are typically tied to the views
of the Romans. E.g., PIERRE CORNIOLEY, NATURALIS OBLIGATIO: ESSAI SUR L’ORIGINE ET
L’EVOLUTION DE LA NOTION EN DROIT ROMAIN (1964); Marcel Planiol, Assimilation
Progressive de l’Obligation Naturelle et du Devoir Moral, 62 REVUE CRITIQUE DE LEGISLATION
ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 152 (1913).
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Mansfield) are typically disparaged.186 Although few in the world of
human rights welcome it, the decision of the Supreme Court in Jesner
v. Arab Bank, PLC187 will accord with this side of the argument as it
makes legal liability against corporations more difficult to impose.
These arguments against public regulation need to be recognized,
and ideally, answered. At the same time, there are strong arguments
in favor of public regulation, put forward most convincingly by Provost
Locke based on his extensive empirical investigation. At present, then,
the case seems unclear with respect to public regulation, particularly
when geopolitical realities are taken into account. That makes the
effective use of private regulation all the more important.
B. The New Social Contracts, New Governance, and New Model Contract
Clauses—Toward a Version 2.0
The discussion so far shows the hope that may be pinned on the
MCCs, but the empirical studies, the theoretical literature, and the
advocacy pieces all seem to underscore the limits of the approach
taken by the MCCs. This is particularly true with respect to their
emphasis on punishing noncomplying suppliers188 and their
concentration of power in the hands of grasping Western (or
Northern) buyers subservient to their greedy Western (or Northern)
markets. Yet a successful business lawyer must cling to optimism;
otherwise, no big deal would ever close. Even knowing the
compromises, holes—and thus risks—of the last deal, new deals await,
and in this case the research points the way.
To the extent the musings in the previous section are correct, the
“braiding” of formal and informal contractual obligations suggests a
promising path for a new approach, extrapolating from the research
of Professors Gilson, Sabel, and Scott. They show how such structures
have worked in contracts for innovation,189 and the strategies they
explore might be transposed to the supply chain context. There

186. A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF
323 (1975).
187. 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
188. Compare LOCKE, supra note 4, at 20 (on the limits of deterrence mechanisms),
with Dadush, supra note 27, at 1534–46 (on the buyer’s contribution to violation
through purchasing practices).
189. Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal
Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010) (arguing
braided contracts involve low-powered sanctions for formal contractual obligations
that complement, not crowd-out, the informal contractual obligations).
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should be room for formal and enforceable obligations as well as
informal ones that are not legally enforceable, although they may be
implemented by the parties themselves through contractual
mechanisms that they set up themselves. The parties effectuate this
strategy through formal governance structures—in essence, the
contracts are more about establishing joint governance structures than
about setting rules.190 This organization allows for learning191 and for
the development of rules and norms as the parties learn from each
other in an echo of the “reflexive regulation” or “experimentalist
governance” practices that have been of so much interest to political
scientists. Similarly, William Simon has shown how John Dewey’s
pragmatism can combine with liberal politics and emerging business
practices.192 As lawyers devote more time and energy to understanding
supply chain operations,193 these insights can be harnessed to improve
not only product innovation and manufacturing but also human rights
protections for workers. Buyers have plenty of reasons to have their
own personnel on factory floors in their suppliers’ countries; as the
parties learn in each other’s presence, they can improve efficiency,
quality, and human rights.194 This reflexive (or reflective) governance,
mutual learning, and mutual disruption may be the most promising
path forward. These are large matters with a deep, multifaceted, and
evolving literature, and taking advantage of their insights and power
will require further work. But incorporation of Model Contract
Clauses 2.0, if the clauses establish governance mechanisms to enable
the kind of learning and improvement envisioned by these thinkers,
will make the supply contracts even more like social contracts. Social
contracts are, after all, about instituting structures of governance and
not simply about establishing rules and norms.
190. See id. at 1382–83.
191. E.g., GARY HERRIGEL, MANUFACTURING POSSIBILITIES: CREATIVE ACTION AND
INDUSTRIAL RECOMPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY, AND JAPAN (2010).
192. See William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes,
in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 63 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne
Scott eds., 2006); William H. Simon, The Institutional Configuration of Deweyan Democracy,
9 CONTEMP. PRAGMATISM 5 (2012).
193. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network
Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561 (2015); see also Charles F.
Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Neither Modularity nor Relational Contracting: Inter-Firm
Collaboration in the New Economy, 5 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 388 (2004).
194. See LOCKE, supra note 4, at 60 (explaining that more Nike personnel visits at a supplier
factory correlate with higher M-Audit scores); see also id. at 19 (harnessing “experimentalist
governance” and “responsive regulation” for protecting workers in supply chains).
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CONCLUSION
The MCCs are a strong and important step in a complex terrain.
They encourage and enable private efforts to improve conditions in
supply chains, with sensitivity to legal and pragmatic issues like the
need to manage risk, limit client exposure, and navigate corporate
politics. In that landscape, there is a strong temptation to do nothing,
or as little as possible, but serious strides are required not only because
of growing legal obligations but because of the pressing moral duty to
act, the human impetus for compassion, the crucial commitment to
equality—and the (assumed) unlikelihood of widely effective public
regulation in the foreseeable future. Particularly because effective
public regulation, given practical and political realities, is less certain
than might be thought, an avenue for private action is especially
critical. The MCCs aim to put companies on this road in a way that
they will find not only practical but valuable.
As the previous section suggests, a second version of the MCCs, radically
revised and wholly reoriented, beckons with a sense of further hope. For
some, the current MCCs may seem like a step that is unduly short and
cautious. But it is a strong step, and a first step enables a second, and hope
springs from the knowledge that second steps can be longer. The
learning from the last few years might be brought to bear on the next
version of the MCCs, but those insights contemplate a different kind of
supply chain management, implemented currently by some companies
but not by many, along with different kinds of contracts. Next steps will
also likely take into account movements into distributed ledger
technology (often called block chain), a powerful tool both for managing
supply chains and potentially for monitoring human rights.
But those are next steps. In the meantime, the current MCCs allow
companies to start moving now, whether on their own or in concert
with (or at the prodding of) public authorities and civil society. The
project provides a valve through which human rights and humane
compassion can enter the legal and operational realms of the
corporate world, harnessing natural self-interest and shared morality
into a legal and social structure that spans heedlessly across national
boundaries and that pulls multinational enterprises into social
contracts previously constrained by geographic borders and oldfashioned notions of nation-states. Whether in their current version
or the next, the MCCs offer hope, but both now and for as long as we
can see, the work will need to continue.

